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INTRODUCTION
On July 7, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a
Grand Chamber, handed down two long-awaited judgments on the subject
of the extraterritorial reach and scope of the European Convention on
* Visiting Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law.
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Human Rights (ECHR).I In both Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom' and AI-Jedda
v. United Kingdom,3 the underlying issue was whether or not the United
Kingdom was bound by its treaty obligations under the ECHR with regard
to its military presence in Iraq. Al-Skeini involved the joined claims of six
Iraqi nationals whose relatives were killed while allegedly under U.K. juris-
diction in Iraq; they claimed a lack of effective investigation into the deaths
under Article 2. In Al-Jedda, a dual Iraqi-U.K. citizen challenged the law-
fulness of his three-year detention in a British-controlled detention facility
in Basrah City, Iraq. Both cases touch on the pivotal issue of U.K. jurisdic-
tion over persons in Iraq, though the paths taken in the analysis of each case
diverge from the outset. For AI-Skeini, the critical calculus was determining
the existence of Article 1 jurisdiction, from which all ECHR obligations fol-
low, while Al-Jedda's inquiry focused primarily on the presence of
attribution, without which no international responsibility could lie. Because
of its greater bearing on Article 1 jurisdiction, AI-Skeini will be the primary
focus of attention here. This Article seeks to comprehensively examine the
Court's treatment of extraterritoriality by tracing the history of provisions
relevant to the issue as well as its evolving jurisprudence, including these
recent landmark cases.
A. The Pertinence of Extraterritoriality
Why were these judgments so long awaited? Although both cover a
range of legal issues, their bearing on the issue of the extraterritorial scope
of the ECHR has been particularly anticipated for several reasons. At the
outset, the European Court of Human Rights has arguably generated the
most prolific jurisprudence on the subject of a treaty's extraterritorial appli-
cation, contributing to the sense that any judgment on the issue would be
closely watched. Added to that has been the persistent state of flux and con-
fusion permeating the Court's jurisprudence on extraterritoriality since
2001, when the high-profile Bankovi6 v. Belgium decision emerged as a con-
troversial retrenchment of extraterritoriality by establishing several limiting
criteria for the Convention's application.4 Surprisingly, what has followed in
its ten-year wake has not been a new line of post-Bankovi6 corrections limit-
ing the recognition of extraterritoriality. Instead, the Court has gently
sidestepped it, proceeding apace with its earlier practice in which extraterri-
torial jurisdiction was recognized seemingly on an ad hoc basis.5 The result
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter ECHR]. The Convention has
been amended several times, most recently in 2010, and the current text of the treaty can be
found online at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/ENGCONV.pdf.
2. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2011).
3. AI-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 789 (2011).
4. Bankovi6 v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
5. See infa Part III.
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has been confusion and ambiguity about when a state party has exercised
extraterritorial jurisdiction so as to trigger the full panoply of Convention
rights and obligations-and when it has not. Against this backdrop lie the
cases of AI-Skeini and Al-Jedda, whose advancement from the U.K. divi-
sional courts to the House of Lords did nothing to quell the confusion over
the influence of Bankovi6 vis-A-vis the Court's later jurisprudence on extra-
territoriality. It is in this light that the two cases were anticipated-in the
hope that they would herald a long-awaited clarification of the Court's case
law on extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Problematically, these two judgments may ultimately do more to per-
petuate confusion than to articulate a clear and principled basis for
extraterritoriality under the Convention. First, they simultaneously ratify
certain aspects of Bankovi6 while carefully reversing others-thereby seem-
ingly leaving intact questions over the case's authoritative status. 6 At the
same time, the judgments seem to indicate a policy preference for staying
within recognized grounds for extraterritoriality.7 This Article takes as its
starting point the most current state of affairs on extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the ECHR by canvassing these recent developments in the Court's ex-
traterritorial jurisprudence. This introductory examination of the recent
developments and dominant characteristics of Article 1 jurisdiction sets the
stage for a more comprehensive historical investigation into the origins and
progressive evolution of factors influencing the extraterritorial applicability
of the ECHR.
B. Context of the Judgments
Prior to the issue of the Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda judgments, the 2001
Bankovi6 decision loomed large as a watershed decision that struck out
against seemingly ever-expanding extraterritorial jurisprudence. It sharply
reframed the issues, emphasizing in the process several key characteristics
of the Convention that shape the Court's jurisprudence on extraterritoriality.
The first of these was to characterize jurisdiction as "primarily territorial" 8
while extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction were to remain "exceptional," re-
quiring special justification.9
Within this predominantly territorial context, the Bankovik Court went
on to recognize certain limited exceptional bases for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. In addition to those bases already acknowledged under international
law through custom or treaty provisions, 10 the Court also identified acts of a
state's authorities performed outside its territory" and the exercise of
6. See generally infra Introduction, Section C.
7. See infra Introduction, Section C.
8. Bankovi6, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 59.
9. Id. 61.
10. Id. 73. Bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction include "nationality, flag, diplomatic
and consular relations, effect, protection, passive personality and universality." Id. 59.
11. Id. 169.
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effective control of an area (ECA) as a consequence of lawful or unlawful
military action. 12 Importantly, it collectively characterized these extraterrito-
rial bases as occurring
when the respondent State, through the effective control of the rele-
vant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of
military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquies-
cence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of
the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government. 3
Second, the Court in Bankovi6 roundly rejected applicants' novel argu-
ment that Convention obligations adhere proportionally to the level of
control exerted by a state party. It did so on the grounds that Convention
rights could not be "divided and tailored" to the particular circumstances of
an extraterritorial act.14 Accordingly, if extraterritorial jurisdiction was found
to exist, the entire panoply of Convention rights must consequently apply.
Third, the Court emphasized the "special character" of the Convention
as "a constitutional instrument of European public order" in order to stress
its role "in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space
(espace juridique) of the Contracting States."' 5 The Court distinguished its
prior jurisprudence aimed at avoiding a legal vacuum as limited to instances
where one contracting state exercised jurisdiction in the territory of another.
As for the conduct of a contracting state outside the Convention's legal
space, the Court indicated that "[t]he Convention was not designed to be ap-
plied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting
States."' 6
Finally, the Court rejected as unpersuasive the applicants' attempt to
characterize some of its earlier jurisprudence as constituting recognition of a
separate basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction amounting to state-agent au-
thority (SAA) over persons 7 in a foreign territory.
8
C. Content of the Judgments
For its part, Al-Skeini weighs in on each of these notable aspects of the
Bankovi decision. On the issue of the recognized bases for extraterritorial
jurisdiction, the Court reiterated its position that jurisdiction is "primarily
12. Id. 70.




17. This basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction first came to be so characterized in the
U.K. Court of Appeal (Civil) review of Al-Skeini. See Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for
Defence, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [147]-[148] (Eng.).
18. Bankovi6, 2001 -XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 81.
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territorial" and extraterritorial bases are "exceptional."19 Significantly, how-
ever, it reversed Bankovic's position on SAA,20 recognizing as a valid basis
for extraterritorial jurisdiction a ground that many believed had been reject-
ed under Bankovi6.21 It described this category as embracing a variety of
circumstances, including acts of diplomatic and consular agents (legitimate-
ly on foreign soil) who "exert authority and control over others, 22 as well as
instances in which a state, "through the consent, invitation or acquiescence
of the Government of that territory ... exercises all or some of the public
powers normally to be exercised by that Government.
'23
In addition to these internationally legitimate instances, the Court also
recognized that "the use of force by a State's agents operating outside its
territory" (legitimately or not) may also bring individuals under control of
its authorities, such as where an "individual is taken into custody of State
agents abroad."24 This newly recognized SAA basis for extraterritorial
jurisdiction was later restated to form the basis of another reversal of
Bankovi6, with the Court holding:
[W]henever the State through its agents exercises control and au-
thority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under
an obligation under Article I to secure to that individual the rights
and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to
the situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Conven-
tion rights can be "divided and tailored.
2
As a result, cherry-picking Convention rights is now endorsed by the Court
under the newly recognized SAA basis for Article 1 jurisdiction.
Alongside this newly recognized basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction,
the Al-Skeini Court ratified the previously recognized ground of ECA.26 In a
notable departure from Bankovi6, however, it distinguished the legal effect
of this basis from that of SAA so that whereas the latter was subject to
19. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, 131
(2011).
20. Id. 1 133-137.
21. Rick Lawson, Life After Bankovid: On the Extraterritorial Application of the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES 83, 120 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004). But see Michael
O'Boyle, The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A
Comment on 'Life After Bankovi6,' in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES, supra, at 125, 138-39.
22. AI-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 134.
23. Id. 1 135. Notably, this characterization in Bankovi6 applied only to extraterritorial
control over an area, not to SAA over persons. Compare id. 1H 134-135 (recognizing extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction as arising from either SAA or ECA) with Bankovi6, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
R 69-71 (recognizing extraterritorial jurisdiction as arising from ECA).
24. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 136.
25. Id. 137 (emphasis added) (comparing Bankovi6, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 75).
26. Id. 138.
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Convention rights and obligations being "divided and tailored," the former
was not. Accordingly, when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military
action, a contracting state exercises ECA outside its national territory, "[t]he
controlling State has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within the
area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set out in the
Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified." 27 Determi-
nations of this basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction remain questions of fact
"separate and distinct" from the Article 56 mechanism governing Conven-
tion applicability to parties' dependent territories.
28
Finally, the Al-Skeini Court revisited the concept of the Convention's
character as a regional instrument of European public order with regard to
its applicability outside the Convention's espacejuridique.29 Here again, the
Court broke new ground by clarifying that while the "legal vacuum" princi-
ple operates only where a contracting state exercises jurisdiction in the
territory of another, it should not be taken to mean that "jurisdiction under
Article 1 of the Convention can never exist outside the territory covered by
the Council of Europe Member States."30 With this single statement, the
Court effectively abandoned the very notion of regionally confined extrater-
ritoriality it had so deliberately intimated in Bankovi6.
On the basis of these new principles, the Court proceeded to recognize
the role of the United Kingdom (together with the United States) as an oc-
cupying power in Iraq from May 1, 2003, until the installation of the interim
government. Accordingly, the Court found that it was in the United King-
dom's capacity as an occupying power in southeast Iraq that it "assumed in
Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a
sovereign govemment" 1-a statement evoking its Bankovi6 heritage.32 On
this basis, the Court found that the United Kingdom "exercised authority
and control over individuals killed in the course of [its military] security op-
erations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the
United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention."33 After
dispensing with the attribution issue, the Court came to the identical conclu-
sion in A1-Jedda: that the applicant's internment in a detention facility in
Basrah City under the United Kingdom's exclusive control throughout his
detention placed him "within the authority and control of the United King-
27. Id. 137-138 (emphasis added).
28. Id. H 139-140.
29. Id. 141; accord Bankovi6, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 80. The European Court of
Human Right's assertion that "[t]he Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the
world, even in respect of the conduct of the Contracting States" was justified by reference to
the fact that "the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating ... in an essentially regional
context and notably in the legal space (espacejuridique) of the Contracting States." Bankovi6,
2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 80.
30. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 142.
31. Id. R 143, 149.




dom" and therefore within its Article 1 jurisdiction.' In a sweeping gesture,
therefore, these twin cases recognized the United Kingdom's military occu-
pation in Iraq to constitute an exercise of Article 1 jurisdiction not on the
basis of ECA-the touchstone for extraterritoriality in Bankovic-but on the
newly recognized ground of SAA over persons, freshly appointed as em-
bracing instances in which a state exercises "all or some of the public
powers normally to be exercised by that Government."
35
D. Issues Raised
Al-Skeini raises several issues with regard to the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Convention. Among them: On what grounds did the exercise of "all
or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government"
suddenly revert from comprising ECA jurisdiction to SAA jurisdiction? What
is the effect of allowing Convention rights to be "divided and tailored" for one
jurisdictional basis (SAA) but not for another (ECA)?36 And finally, if the
formal existence of a military occupation is not sufficient to constitute ECA,
what is? On many levels, the judgment would seem to raise more questions
than answers with regard to the Court's extraterritorial-jurisdiction cases.
E. Issues of Territoriality and Extraterritoriality
This Article starts from the premise that the Court's most recent cases
on extraterritorial jurisdiction do little to quell the growing confusion sur-
rounding its Article 1 jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court's insistence on
continued development of its existing line of cases arguably leads it further
down a path of incoherence.37 In response, this Article undertakes a de novo
investigation of elements influencing the Convention's territorial and extra-
territorial scope, examining the complex interplay of factors contributing to
extraterritoriality. In addition to the influence of the ECHR's Article 1 juris-
diction clause, this Article recognizes the equally significant contribution of
a second treaty provision-Article 56-to the question of extraterritoriality:
a colonial clause,38 about which very little has been written.3 9 In particular, it
34. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 789, 85-86
(2011).
35. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 135 (citing Bankovid v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 333, 7 1).
36. On that note, given that the exercise of SAA jurisdiction can trigger the operation of
only certain Convention rights, but ECA automatically results in the application of the entire
panoply of rights, it appears that the Court has essentially created a two-tiered system of Con-
vention rights in the extraterritorial setting.
37. See AI-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 78 (Bonello, J., concurring).
38. Colonial clauses are generic treaty provisions that specify the extent to which a giv-
en treaty may or may not extend its application to a state party's territorial dependencies. See
infra Part I.A.
39. One notable exception can be found in Louise Moor & AW Brian Simpson, Ghosts
of Colonialism in the European Convention on Human Rights, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 121,
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emphasizes the influential role of Article 56 in shaping conceptions of the
Convention's territorial application, while simultaneously interfering with
the jurisprudential development of the Convention's extraterritorial applica-
tion under Article 1. In the process, this Article examines the
interrelationship between these two provisions, their drafting history, and
the state of Convention jurisprudence on extraterritoriality. What it reveals is
a complex interplay between two provisions whose case law is as difficult to
reconcile as it is to coherently apply. More broadly, these findings are signif-
icant for suggesting that a treaty's unique drafting history and text, as well
as the interplay among its provisions, may have greater bearing and rele-
vance upon determinations of its geographic scope of application than the
mere existence of similarly framed jurisdiction clauses found in other in-
struments.
Parts I and II of this Article therefore introduce the content and drafting
history, respectively, of the two ECHR provisions bearing directly on the is-
sue of the instrument's territorial scope. In Part III, the jurisprudence of each
of these provisions is individually examined in order to shed light on the
very different approaches taken by the Court with respect to each provision,
and also to observe the manner in which each provision has, or has not,
evolved over time.
I. RELEVANT CONVENTION PROVISIONS
A. Article 56 ECHR
Any examination of the Convention's extraterritorial application is
complicated by the fact that it is governed by at least two provisions.4' The
first, Article 56 (former Article 63) is a territorial-application provision gov-
erning the extension of the Convention to the dependent territories of the
contracting parties. More commonly known as a colonial clause, it governs
the application of the Convention to the former colonial territories by refer-
ence to "territories for whose international relations the Contracting Party is
responsible." '41
Its modem day text has been renumbered and slightly modified by Pro-
tocol 11, and it provides as follows:
ECHR Article 56---Territorial application
4 2
121, 125-26 (2005) (noting, however, that the "colonial clause" language was not included in
the text of the Convention).
40. Several of the Convention protocols contain separate colonial or territorial clauses
that will not be examined here. See ECHR.
41. Id. art. 56.
42. Formerly Article 63, this provision was renumbered and amended by Protocol No.




1. Any State may at the time of its ratification or at any time there-
after declare by notification addressed to the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe that the present Convention shall, sub-
ject to paragraph 4 of this Article, extend to all or any of the
territories for whose international relations it is responsible.
2. The Convention shall extend to the territory or territories named
in the notification as from the thirtieth day after the receipt of
this notification by the Secretary General of the Council of Eu-
rope.
3. The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in such terri-
tories with due regard, however, to local requirements.
4. Any State which has made a declaration in accordance with par-
agraph 1 of this Article may at any time thereafter declare on
behalf of one or more of the territories to which the declaration
relates that it accepts the competence of the Court to receive ap-
plications from individuals, non-governmental organisations or
groups of individuals as provided by Article 34 of the Conven-
tion.43
Of the four subprovisions, Article 56(1) constitutes a classic example of
a negative colonial clause,44 permitting state parties to extend the Conven-
tion to "all or any of the territories for whose international relations it is
responsible" '45 if it so chooses. As some commentators have noted, this pow-
er to extend Convention protection also constitutes by default the power to
withhold it,4 6 and though this type of colonial clause was not uncommon in
international instruments of that era, it was, even at the time, a feature
"strangely out of place ... in a Convention of this kind."47 As a result, Arti-
cle 56(1) proved controversial during the Convention's drafting stage,
discussed in greater detail below.4" Article 56(2) concerns the procedural
43. ECHR art. 56.
44. Colonial clauses typically take one of three forms, including "optional application"
by which "the instrument does not apply to the dependent territories of any contracting state
unless the latter chooses to extend the application of the instrument to all or any of its depend-
ent territories." Yuen-Li Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations, 45
AM. J. INT'L L. 108, 108 (1951). Colonial clauses that presumptively excluded dependent ter-
ritories absent a contrary declaration were also referred to as "negative" clauses. See J.E.S.
Fawcett, Treaty Relations of British Overseas Territories, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 86, 96-97
(1949).
45. ECHR art. 56(1).
46. Moor & Simpson, supra note 39, at 121.
47. Eur. Consult. Ass., First Part of Second Session of the Consultative Assembly
(Strasbourg 7 to 28 August 1950), reprinted in 5 COUNCIL OF EUR., COLLECTED EDITION OF
THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 172,
280 (1979) [hereinafter Consultative Assembly: Second Session Part One] (statement of Fr.
Rep. Mr. Silvandre).
48. See infra Part I.
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effect of such a notification, and Article 56(3) constitutes a colonial general-
limitations clause permitting modified application of Convention provisions
in dependent territories. Because subprovisions (2) and (3) do not directly
concern territorial treaty application as such, they will not be examined in
detail in this Article. Article 56(4) is relevant, however, as it requires a fur-
ther explicit declaration in order for the right of individual petition to apply
to any territories where the Convention has already been applied under sub-
provision (1).
49
As noted above, Article 56 was amended by Protocol 11,10 which re-
numbered the provision and also amended the texts of subprovisions (1) and
(4) concerning declarations of extension for the Convention and the right of
individual application1.5 One significant effect of Protocol 11 has been to
make the right of individual application mandatory for the contracting par-
ties, although curiously it has not resulted in a repeal of Article 56(4), which
continues to require an explicit declaration of extension before it can have
effect in the dependent territories. Therefore, notwithstanding the entry into
force of Protocol 11 and the now-automatic right of the Court to receive ap-
plications from anyone "claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the
High Contracting Parties,"52 no such right is recognized in the "territories" un-
less a valid declaration of extension has been made under both Articles 56(1)
and 56(4). Because the present inquiry is concerned with an examination of
the extraterritorial application of the Convention, discussion of the relevant
colonial-clause case law will focus primarily on Articles 56(1) and 56(4) of
the ECHR.53 Similarly phrased colonial clauses found in other Convention
protocols will not be examined.54
49. ECHR art. 56(4).
50. Protocol No. 11, supra note 42, art. 2(1).
51. Id. art. 2(3). The Protocol reads:
In new Article 56, in paragraph 1, the words ", subject to paragraph 4 of this Arti-
cle" shall be inserted after the word "shall"; in paragraph 4, the words
"Commission to receive petitions" and "in accordance with Article 25 of the present
Convention" shall be replaced by the words "Court to receive applications" and "as
provided in Article 34 of the Convention" respectively. In new Article 58, paragraph
4, the words "Article 63" shall be replaced by the words "Article 56."
Id.
52. Id. art. I (amending Article 34 on individual applications).
53. This provision will be referred to as Article 56 throughout this Article for the sake
of consistency, except when historical references require a reference to former Article 63 for
purposes of clarity.
54. Colonial clauses similar to Article 56(4) can be found in Protocols 4, 6, 7, 12, and
13 but will not be canvassed here for reasons related to variability of drafting language and
dearth of case law. Many of these instruments contain a reference simply to "territory" in lieu
of the standard colonial phrase "territories for whose international relations it is responsible,"
e.g., ECHR art. 56(1), a deviation that renders their construction both more complex and more
dependent on the parent instrument. In addition, several of the protocols also permit a sliding
scale of application in which a party may communicate a declaration "stating the extent to
which it undertakes" to apply the provisions of a given protocol, e.g., Protocol to the ECHR,
[Vol. 33:693
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Since its first examination by a Convention body, the phrase "territories
for whose international relations [a state party] is responsible" has been
construed broadly to encompass a wide array of territories enjoying diverse
legal statuses. As early as 1961, the European Commission observed that the
phrase "has succeeded other, more restrictive terms employed such as 'colo-
nies,' or 'non-metropolitan areas"' and that "this change represents an effort
to facilitate, although without rendering compulsory, the application of the
more important international treaties to territories the status of which is as
varied as it is changeable but without assigning a final degree of importance
to any one such status. '55 Although termed a "colonial clause," Article 56
remains applicable to dependent territories irrespective of domestic legal
status.
56
Article 56 relates to territorial application in the sense that it dictates the
circumstances under which the Convention will apply to certain territories.
More important, however, is its effect upon the concept of territorial applica-
tion for the Convention at large. By relegating the dependent territories to
these provisions, Article 56 operates to circumscribe the default application
of the Convention to the metropolitan territories.5 7 Thus, an application
brought by two Belgian nationals residing in the Congo and alleging Bel-
gian violations under the First Protocol failed to establish that the
Convention's "territorial field of application" extended to the Congo
because of the absence of a valid declaration as required by that Protocol's
Article 4, notwithstanding that at the relevant time Belgium's domestic law
treated the Congo as part of its metropolitan territory.58 This rejection of a
territory's status under domestic law was later confirmed when the Commis-
sion observed that Article 56 territories are not considered to formally
comprise an integral part of the contracting party.59 When viewed in this
opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. No. 009 (entered into force May 18, 1954) [here-
inafter First Protocol]. Because of these inconsistencies and complexities, the protocol clauses
will not be separately examined, though cases where protocol clauses are applied alongside
the Convention may be discussed.
55. X v. Belgium, App. No. 1065/61, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 260, 266 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.).
56. Whether this extends to trust territories and condominia is perhaps a more debatable
and complex issue. Moor & Simpson, supra note 39, at 128-30.
57. Metropolitan territories are distinguished from dependent territories for purposes of
the scope of a treaty's territorial application.
58. X v. Belgium, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 266, 268.
59. X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8873/80, 28 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 99,
104-05 (1982) ("The specific constitutional status of Jersey has been recognised in the system
of the European Convention on Human Rights because the Convention was formally extended
to Jersey under Article 63 of the Convention. This reflects the fact that Jersey is treated as a
territory for whose international relations the United Kingdom is responsible but which does
not, in itself, form part of the United Kingdom."); X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7444/76,
11 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 111, 111-12 (1977) ("The applicant's complaints are
directed solely against the actions of the courts and authorities of Dominica, a territory for
whose international relations the United Kingdom is responsible and to which the Convention
extends by virtue of a declaration made by the United Kingdom under Article 63, paragraph I
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manner, Article 56 not only has relevance to the territorial application of the
Convention as a general matter-it also directly governs an aspect of the
extraterritorial application of the Convention vis-h-vis the parties' nonmet-
ropolitan territories by stipulating an explicit set of conditions under which
the Convention can come to apply to territories that would otherwise remain
beyond its scope. The jurisprudence pertaining to this provision will be seen
to be, for reasons directly related to the rapid decline of colonialism follow-
ing the Convention's drafting, both static and strictly construed. 60 Over time,
the jurisprudential development of Article 56 has come to produce a prob-
lematic inconsistency with another provision, Article 1.61
B. Article 1 ECHR
The second provision governing the territorial and extraterritorial scope
of application of the Convention is Article 1, which provides: "The High
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention. 62 Article 1 is of
special significance to the Convention. It has been interpreted not as a stand-
alone substantive right but as a so-called "framework provision" that enables
and gives effect to the Convention's system of rights.63 This special status
makes it "determinative of the very scope of the Contracting Parties' posi-
tive obligations and, as such, of the scope and reach of the entire Convention
system."64 As such, Article 1 has immediate bearing and relevance to the
Convention's scope of application ratione loci, ratione materiae, and ra-
tione personae.6 Perhaps because of its breadth, Article 1 has generated not
only a large body of case law, but also has shown itself capable of an evolv-
ing and dynamic jurisprudence consistent with the Court's "living
of the Convention. However, the Commission may only deal with an individual application
directed against the authorities of such a territory where the High Contracting Party concerned
has also made a declaration under Article 63, paragraph 4 of the Convention on behalf of the
territory concerned....")
60. See infra Parts ILA, III.A.2.
61. See infra Part III.E.
62. ECHR art. 1.
63. Streletz v. Germany, 2001-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 409, 1 112; K.-H. W. v. Germany, 2001-
IH Eur. Ct. H.R. 495, 118; United Communist Party of Turk. v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
1, 29; Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 238 (1978).
64. Bankovid v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 65.
65. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim $irketi v. Ireland
(Bosphorus Airways), 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 137. Convention jurisprudence uses the
terms ratione loci, ratione nateriae, and ratione personae to refer to the Convention's scope
of application over territory, subject matter, and persons, respectively. For the sake of
consistency, this Article will rely on the same terminology, with a particular emphasis on
territorial scope (scope ratione loci) or territorial jurisdiction (jurisdiction ratione loci).
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instrument" approach66 to interpretation, notwithstanding Bankovi5's sug-
gestion that Article 1 is somehow uniquely exempt therefrom.
6 7
The coexistence of two separate provisions with overlapping territorial
subject matter has long posed problems for ECHR jurists and commenta-
tors. Although it is formally conceded that Articles 1 and 56 jointly operate
to inform the scope of the Convention ratione loci,68 most of the literature
concerning its extraterritorial scope has focused on the role of Article 1 with
little or no analysis of the supporting role played by Article 56.69 In some in-
stances, the examination of extraterritorial application has focused on trends
across multiple human rights instruments 70 or in regard to the intersection of
66. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 31 (1978) (re-
calling that the Convention is a "living instrument" that "must be interpreted in the light of
present-day conditions").
67. Bankovi6, 2001 -XII Eur. Ct. H.R. in 64-65.
68. See, e.g., P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 17-23 (4th ed. 2006); infra Part UI.E.
69. E.g., J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 3-32, 399 (1987) (dedicating twenty-nine pages to Article 1 analysis, but
only one page to Article 63); Lawson, supra note 21, at 83 (discussing Article 1 jurisdiction
without mentioning Article 56); Michal Gondek, Extraterritorial Application of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Territorial Focus in the Age of Globalization?, 52 NETH. INT'L
L. REV. 349, 352 (2005) ("The scope of extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR must
therefore be determined by reference to its own provisions, mainly Article 1 ECHR. It is this
provision that lies at the heart of the legal controversy on the issue."); Michael Kearney,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the European Convention on Human Rights, 5 TRINITY C. L.
REV. 126, 146 (2002) (noting that Article 1 jurisdiction extends "to acts committed by State
organs outside the national territory of that State," but also interpreting Article 1 in
conjunction with Article 15 on derogations); Sarah Miller, Revisiting Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the European
Convention, 20 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1223, 1226 (2009) (discussing the "Incoherence of the
Court's Recent Extraterritorial Jurisprudence" concerning Article 1); Georg Ress, Problems of
Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations-The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights: The Bankovid Case, 12 IT. Y.B. INT'L L. 51, 53 (2002) ("In order to properly assess
the Court's reasoning in Bankovi6 it is necessary to briefly outline the development of the
jurisprudence regarding the term 'jurisdiction' in Article I of the Convention."); see also
CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 18-37 (4th ed. 2006) (dedicating an entire chapter to exploring "a number of
significant issues arising from the obligation in Article 1," but only mentioning Article 56 as
one of the "Other Issues Relating to Territorial Scope"); Morten Peschardt Pedersen,
Territorial Jurisdiction in Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 73 NORDIC
J. INT'L L. 279, 280 (2004) ("The aim of this article is to evaluate the case law on jurisdiction
in Article I of the Convention in light of principles of jurisdiction in international public law
and the rules of treaty interpretation....").
70. See, e.g., Damira Kamchibekova, State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human
Rights Violations, 13 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 87 (2007); Hugh King, The Extraterritorial
Human Rights Obligations of States, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 521 (2009); Theodor Meron,
Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1995); Marko Milanovic,
From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights
Treaties, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 411 (2008); Kelvin Widdows, The Application of Treaties to
Nationals of a Party Outside Its Territory, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 724 (1986); Ralph Wilde,
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extraterritorial application of human rights instruments with international
humanitarian law in times of armed conflict.71 Whatever the reason may be,
studies of the Convention's drafting history indicate that the overlap be-
tween Articles 1 and 56 may have simply passed unnoticed by drafters at the
time.72 Today the body of Convention case law makes it clear that, notwith-
standing the diminishing relevance of Article 56, an inevitable clash
between the two provisions has occurred, and the poorly articulated rela-
tionship between them has resulted in awkwardly inconsistent doctrine
concerning the Convention's extraterritorial application.73 Having briefly in-
troduced each of the provisions and their relevance to the Convention's
extraterritorial application, this Article will next examine the historical con-
text forming the backdrop to the Convention negotiations and provide a
detailed drafting history of the two provisions. The analysis gives rise to cer-
tain conclusions about the interaction and relationship between Articles 1
and 56, which will then be examined in light of the body of jurisprudence
that has developed in relation to them over time.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TERRITORIAL PROVISIONS
A. Article 56: British Colonial Influence
The reference in Article 56 to "territories for whose international rela-
tions [a state party] is responsible" highlights its colonial origins.74 In terms
of its drafting history, a colonial clause granting discretionary authority to
extend or withhold the Convention from colonies was sought unilaterally by
the United Kingdom.75 Britain actively pursued such a clause in order to
give effect to its constitutionally required practice of local consultation,
Triggering State Obligations Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human Rights
Treaties, 40 ISR. L. REV. 503 (2007).
71. John Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power: The Intersection of Human Rights Law & the
Law of Non-International Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial Context, 40 ISR. L. REV. 396,
398 (2007); Michael J. Dennis, Application of the Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in
imes of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 121-22 (2005);
Kearney, supra note 69, at 127-28.
72. Moor & Simpson, supra note 39, at 136-50; see also A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION 773 (2001) ("[T]hroughout the negotiation of both the convention and the Pro-
tocol there never was a serious discussion of whether it made much sense to draft a European
instrument embodying the fundamentals of European liberal democracy and then made possi-
ble its application to colonies which in no sense belonged to the club.").
73. See infra Part lI.
74. T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 51 (1974) ("The modem use of the co-
lonial application clause is to avoid enumerating the various categories of dependencies and to
employ a phrase referring to 'territories for whose international relations the Government of
the metropolitan is responsible."').
75. SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 290 ("The battle for colonial applications clauses was
entirely fought by the United Kingdom; other colonial powers, and France in particular, had,
as we have seen, a different relationship with dependencies."); see also id. at 476-77.
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whereby it was precluded from enacting treaties in its dependent territories
without first undertaking a consultation process in each. 76 To critics, Brit-
ain's consultation argument was seen as a thinly disguised veil of colonial
subjugation and oppression77 and an attempt to withhold the Convention
from its dependencies. According to Simpson, any fears that Britain would
exclude its dependencies from the Convention were unfounded because "it
was politically out of the question for Britain or its Colonial Office to op-
pose the idea that protection must extend to colonial territories."' 8 The
British
strategy was, somewhat perversely, a defensive one driven by anticolonial-
inspired realpolitik:
The primary motive was not to improve the lot of colonial subjects,
since the assumption was that in general the situation in the colo-
nies conformed to the convention, though in some few cases
changes in law or practice might be needed. Instead the motive was
to present British colonial policy and practice in a favourable light,
by publicly committing colonial governments to respect for human
rights and to furnish an argument for not accepting a UN Covenant
if one was ever adopted.
79
The extent to which Britain's stated policy of extension to the territories
could be successfully reconciled with its dogged pursuit of a colonial clause
permitting their exclusion is somewhat debatable. Within the Council of
Europe, opposition to such a clause was grounded in concerns of Soviet
opprobrium of the West, and a colonial clause was viewed as unnecessarily
inviting just such criticism. For example, according to a Danish member of
the Consultative Assembly:
The application of a colonial clause in the year 1950 presents,
among other things, invaluable opportunities for Communist propa-
ganda. Such a clause which aims at excluding colonial territories
76. See U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons, July 1951, Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 3-4, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.2/21 (July 3, 1951) [hereinafter 1951 Draft Convention on the Status of Refugees],
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL5/105/39/PDF/NL510539.
pdf?OpenElement (stating that at the conference "[a]s a rule the U.K. Government undertook
no obligations on behalf of the colonies under any convention or treaty without consulting the
local Governments" and if the clause were excluded, "metropolitan Governments would be
obliged to consult all their colonial territories before ratifying the covenant"); Geoffrey
Marston, The United Kingdom's Part in the Preparation of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 1950, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 796, 823 (1993).
77. See, e.g., 1951 Draft Convention on the Status of Refugees, supra note 76, at 12 (in-
cluding comments by the Saudi Arabian delegate on colonial clauses condemning the
"consultative" arguments by colonial powers on grounds that he "had seen indigenous inhabit-
ants ask for enjoyment of inalienable rights ... and had seen them brutally refused in the
name of the law and public order").
78. SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 305.
79. Id. at 825.
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from the protection of human rights will inevitably provide a weap-
on which can be used with considerable success against the Council
of Europe and the Western Democracies, first and foremost in their
overseas territories, but also in all ex-colonial territories in Asia, Af-
rica and South America.
8 0
Complicating Britain's somewhat tenuous position was the fact that the
other colonial powers on the Council of Europe did not necessarily support
its pursuit of a colonial clause. During the Convention negotiations there
were five colonial powers in the Council of Europe: Britain, France, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and Denmark."1 Of these, Denmark and the
Netherlands showed little to no interest in securing a colonial clause. Den-
mark, as indicated above, actively opposed the colonial clause,8" possibly in
part because of its lack of need for one: Of its two territories, the Faroe Is-
lands enjoyed legal autonomy and had been self-governing since 1948.83
Greenland briefly enjoyed a declaration of extension under Article 63 on
April 13, 1953, though this quickly ceased to be of relevance when it was
made part of Danish metropolitan territory less than two months later, on
June 5, 1953.84
The Netherlands similarly had little need for a colonial clause. It too
had only two colonial territories at the time, Suriname and the Dutch West
Indies, both of which became self-governing in 1954.85 Although the Neth-
erlands ultimately extended the Convention to these territories by a
declaration on December 1, 1955,86 it has been suggested that the Nether-
lands' lack of any tradition of local consultation "presumably explains the
fact that the Dutch never became involved in pressing for special colonial
applications clauses in international treaties.187 The Netherlands did, howev-
er, eventually support Britain's version of the colonial clause.88
The constitutional treatment of colonial territories by France and
Belgium was also markedly different from Britain's convention of local
80. Consultative Assembly: Second Session Part One, supra note 47, at 240 (statement
of Den. Rep. Mr. Lannung).
81. SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 283 (noting that Spain and Portugal were not yet mem-
bers of the Council of Europe).
82. Consultative Assembly: Second Session Part One, supra note 47, at 240 (statement
of Den. Rep. Mr. Lannung).
83. See Home Rule Act of the Faroe Islands (Translation), No. 137 of March 23, 1948,
§ I (Den.), available at http://www.stm.dkL/p-12710.html ("Within the framework of this Act
the Faroe Islands shall constitute a self-governing community within the State of Denmark.").
84. SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 283; Karel Vasak, The European Convention of Human
Rights Beyond the Frontiers of Europe, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1206, 1210 (1963).
85. SIMPsON, supra note 72, at 283 & n.26.
86. Vasak, supra note 84, at 1210.
87. SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 284.
88. Eur. Consult. Ass., Fifth Session of the Comm. of Ministers Held in Strasbourg, 3-9
August 1950, reprinted in 5 COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 47, at 50, 118 [hereinafter
Committee of Ministers: Fifth Session] (statement of Neth. Rep. Mr. Stikker on Aug. 7, 1950).
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consultation. Under France's Fourth Republic, although its constitution
distinguished between various colonial territories depending on their
particular status as either dpartements or territoires d'outre mer, in
substance legislative activities were centralized in the French Parliament in
Paris. 89 This created the effect of granting "the same rights and freedoms to
all citizens of the French Union' 90 and explains why, from France's
perspective, it anticipated that the Convention would inevitably apply
throughout its territories, as well as why it viewed such a clause as
unnecessary. Although France did not ratify the Convention until 1974,91 its
representatives in the Consultative Assembly expressed vocal criticism of
the colonial clause9 2 and even succeeded in securing approval in the
Assembly for its deletion,93 although the Committee of Ministers chose not
to follow that recommendation. No tradition of local consultation existed in
Belgium either, and its legislative power was similarly consolidated in the
governmental institutions of the metropolitan territory.94 Although Belgium
never extended the Convention to the Congo, it has been argued that it could
not have made an Article 56 declaration without prior approval of its
Parliament.95 Notwithstanding the constitutional situation of France and
Belgium, the text of the colonial clause that eventually became Article 56
would nonetheless require all parties to issue a declaration of extension for
such territories. 96 France's declaration reflects the tension between the
requirements of Article 56 and its own constitutional treatment of overseas
territories as an integral part of its metropolitan territory.91
89. SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 284-86.
90. Consultative Assembly: Second Session Part One, supra note 47, at 280 (statement
of Fr. Rep. Mr. Silvandre).
91. Council of Eur. Treaty Office, Status of Ratification of the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://conventions.
coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=7&DF=22/04/2010&CL=ENG (last
updated Apr. 22, 2010) (stating that France ratified the Convention on May 3, 1974).
92. Eur. Consult. Ass., Second Session of the Consultative Assembly (7-28 August
1950), reprinted in 6 COUNCIL OF EUR., COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX
PRtPARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2, 172-77, 180-82
(1985) [hereinafter Consultative Assembly: Aug. 1950] (statements of Fr. Reps. Mr. Senghor
and Mr. Silvandre).
93. Id. at 182 (putting Mr. Senghor's amendment to delete the whole of Article 63 to a
vote, which carried by forty-six votes to thirty-seven votes).
94. SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 288; Moor & Simpson, supra note 39, at 135.
95. Vasak, supra note 84, at 1211 n.7.
96. See ECHR art. 56(1) (stating that, should a state party want to extend jurisdiction to
such territories, this declaration should be done by notification to the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe).
97. France, in its instrument of ratification, deposited May 3, 1974, declared: "The
Government of the Republic further declares that the Convention shall apply to the whole ter-
ritory of the Republic, having due regard, where the overseas territories are concerned, to local
requirements, as mentioned in Article 63 [Article 56 since the entry into force of Protocol No.
11]." Council of Eur. Treaty Office, List of Declarations Made with Respect to Treaty No. 005,
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B. Article 56 (Formerly 63) Drafting History
It was not always clear that the Convention would contain a colonial
clause. The earliest drafts of the Convention, both prior to98 and within the
Council of Europe,99 contemplated the instrument applying throughout the
entirety of member states' metropolitan and dependent territories:
As regards the question of whether or not the rights set out in Arti-
cle 2 of the draft Resolution should be guaranteed by each State,
not only to all persons residing within its metropolitan territory but
also to all persons residing within its overseas territories or in its
colonial possessions, the majority of the Committee replied in the
affirmative. 00
Once out of the Consultative Assembly, however, the Committee of
Experts 0' immediately began to restrict the automatic application of the
"universal"'0 2 convention. Within six months, three separate provisions
restricting the Convention's application to the dependencies had made their
way into the draft Convention. The first of these was a self-contained
provision strictly limiting free elections and political-speech protections to
the metropolitan territories. 0 3 The second constraint on the Convention's
application to the colonies was a general-limitations clause for the overseas
territories, proposed by Belgium:
Art. 6. The rules given above shall be applied within the overseas
territories, in conformity with local needs and the standard of civili-
zation of the native population, which may not yet have been able
COUNCIL OF EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.
asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF--08/02/201 I &CL=ENG&VL=I (last visited July 6, 2012).
98. Eur. Consult. Ass., Draft European Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in 1
COUNCIL OF EUR., COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX PR9PARATOIRES" OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 296, 296 (1975) [hereinafter Draft ECHR].
99. Eur. Consult. Ass., First Session of the Consultative Assembly Held at Strasbourg
10 August to 8 September 1949: Sittings Held From 16 August to 8 September 1949, reprinted
in I COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 98, at 28, 202 [hereinafter Consultative Assembly: First
Session] (report of Mr. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Comm. on Legal & Admin. Questions).
100. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
101. The Committee of Experts is appointed by the Committee of Ministers.
102. The term "universal" is used in this context to denote the Convention's application
throughout both metropolitan and dependent territories.
103. Eur. Consult. Ass., Meetings of the Committee of Experts Held in Strasbourg from
2nd-8th February 1950 and 6th-lOth March 1950, reprinted in 3 COUNCIL OF EUR.,
COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 180, 238 art. 111 (1976) [hereinafter Committee of Experts: Feb.-Mar 1950].
These rights would eventually be excised entirely from the Convention and later renegotiated
to become the basis for the First Protocol, which contains its own colonial clause. First Proto-
col, supra note 54, art. 4; see SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 753.
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to reach the conditions necessary for the practice of democratic
freedom.' 04
This clause was intended to allow the Convention to apply throughout
both metropolitan and dependent territories of the parties while permitting
the application of some or all of its provisions to be substantively limited "in
conformity with local needs."1 °5 The ambiguous and subjective framing of
the provision was designed to allow significant leeway in the manner in
which the Convention would apply. Such an approach presumed the Con-
vention's automatic application to the dependent territories and sought
instead to temper the manner in which the provisions would be applied
there. As a legal tactic, it reflected a willingness to leave unaltered the scope
of the Convention ratione loci by presuming its automatic extension to both
metropolitan territories and dependencies. 6 Moreover, it preserved the
scope of the Convention ratione personae, taking as a given that persons in
such territories would remain in the Convention's ambit. What it instead al-
tered was the extent of the Convention's subject-matter scope, or application
ratione materiae, in the colonies. As an amendment, it sought to permit ad
hoc adaptations of substantive Convention provisions in the dependencies.
This proposal quickly evolved into a shorter form:
[Art. 8.] d) The rules stated above shall be applied in overseas terri-
tories in the light of local exigencies.107
Later on, it evolved into a new euphemistic standard:
[Art. 7.] d) In the overseas territories the provisions of this Conven-
tion shall be applicable with due regard, however, to local
necessities. 0 s
This latter formulation of the provision would endure throughout the
negotiations and eventually become the basis for Article 56(3). Although
Britain never actively sought this provision, over time, it came to be consid-
ered as a useful backdoor reservationY°9 After the Convention came into
effect, Britain relied on the "local necessities" clause on several occasions
without success."° To date, the provision has only been successfully
104. Committee of Experts: Feb.-Mar. 1950, supra note 103, at 210 (amendment pro-
posed by the Belgian expert).
105. Id.
106. See Moor & Simpson, supra note 39, at 138 (agreeing that former Article 63(3)
does not relate to territorial application but instead relates to the Convention's subject-matter
applicability throughout the dependencies).
107. Committee of Experts: Feb.-Mar. 1950, supra note 103, at 224 (draft art. 8(d)).
108. id. at 238 (draft art. 7(d)).
109. SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 827.
110. See, e.g., Wiggins v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 40, 48
(1978); Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 250, 55-59 (examining and re-
jecting the applicability of former Art 63(3) even where not raised by the contracting party);
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invoked once: by France with regard to its overseas territory, New Caledo-
nia."'
The third restriction imposed on the Assembly's draft Convention was a
requirement that parties obtain consent from semiautonomous or
self-governing dependencies in order for the Convention to apply in such
territories. The consent requirement was determined by the existence of lo-
cal legislative competence in the subject matter:
Art. 42. This Convention shall only apply to territories of the High
Contracting Parties possessing jurisdiction within the fields covered
by the present Convention when the consent of the appropriate au-
thorities of these territories has been obtained. The High
Contracting Parties responsible for those territories shall, if neces-
sary take steps to obtain this consent."
2
This proposed article represents the first articulation of a colonial clause
in the Convention." 3 In contrast to other colonial clauses of the time, 1 4 this
early formulation did not determine a treaty's applicability based on the ex-
istence of a party's declaration of territorial extension, but upon the extent of
local legislative competence and consent." 5 Given the tendency of both Bel-
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, i 36-40 (1978). The phrase
"local necessities" became "local requirements" in the final version of the Convention. ECHR
art. 56(3) ("The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in such territories with due
regard, however, to local requirements.").
111. Py v. France, 2005-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 64. Perhaps tellingly, this case involved the
only instance of a Convention right being limited in order to confer a benefit on a native popu-
lation during the territory's transition to full sovereignty. See id. In 61-65 (noting that the New
Caledonian process of self-determination and local law on residency requirements for voting
constituted "'local requirements' warranting the restrictions imposed on the applicant's right
to vote").
112. Committee of Experts: Feb.-Mar 1950, supra note 103, at 246 (draft art. 42).
113. Id. at 276 ("Art. 42 (new). This article contains the so-called Colonial clause. It was
introduced in order to make provisions for the autonomous powers enjoyed by certain over-
seas territories, in this matter.").
114. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. XII, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Gen-
ocide Convention] ("Any Contracting Party may, at any time, by notification addressed to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to
any or all of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is
responsible."); Convention on Road Traffic art. 28(1), Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008, 125
U.N.T.S. 3. Even the colonial clauses being considered for insertion into the U.N. human
rights covenant were framed in terms of discretionary territorial application "'in respect of
any colony or overseas territory of a State party hereto ... where that State has acceded on
behalf and in respect of such colony or territory.'" SIMPsoN, supra note 72, at 477 (quoting
Sessions of Organs of the United Nations Which Have Considered Questions Relating to Hu-
man Rights, 1947 YB. ON HUM. RTS. 449, 554).
115. Local legislative competence existed among territories "possessing jurisdiction
within the fields covered by the present Convention"; but even for such territories, the Conven-
tion could not apply until "the consent of the appropriate authorities of these territories [had]
been obtained." Eur. Consult. Ass., Conference of Senior Officials Held at Strasbourg 8-17
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gium and France to retain centralized legislative jurisdiction in their national
parliaments," 6 this provision may have represented a misguided attempt to
accommodate Britain's expressed need for local consultation, though it
missed the mark since Britain's consultation requirement was based on a
constitutional convention applicable to all territories, self-governing or
not.'1
7
Notwithstanding the other two constraints in operation, the effect of this
provision was merely to disqualify a very small subset of Convention provi-
sions from applying to an even smaller subset of self-governing territories.
The broader impact of the Convention, left unstated, was that it continued to
apply, notwithstanding these three narrow restrictions, throughout both met-
ropolitan and dependent territories.' 18 Therefore, the draft Convention still
largely contemplated automatic application throughout the entirety of state
territories.
It was only after the Committee of Experts had finished modifying the
Assembly's preliminary draft Convention that the United Kingdom submit-
ted its own draft Convention for the Committee to consider.1 9 Unlike the
existing draft that contained enumerated rights, the British draft sought to
articulate comprehensive definitions. 2° Faced with two alternative drafts, the
Committee of Experts declined to choose between them, instead submitting
both versions for the Ministers' consideration. 2' Alternative A comprised the
original working draft containing enumerated rights, while Alternative B con-
tained the United Kingdom's submission favoring a detailed definition of
rights. Reflecting these differences, Alternative A retained the Belgian-
inspired general-limitations clause,' 22 while Alternative B did not. Both
June 1950, reprinted in 4 COUNCIL OF EUR., COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX PR9PA-
RATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 100, 238 (1977) [hereinafter
Conference of Senior Officials] (draft art. 60(B)).
116. Simpson characterizes France's imperialism as centralized, at least up until 1958.
SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 284-87. Similarly, Belgium's Constitution treated its overseas ter-
ritories as part of its metropolitan territory. Id. at 288; Moor & Simpson, supra note 39, at 142.
117. SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 721-22.
118. It continued to apply by virtue of operation of the draft provision. See supra notes
97-98. Moor and Simpson also characterize the draft provision as being premised on the idea
that the ECHR would apply automatically to overseas dependencies. Moor & Simpson, supra
note 39, at 142.
119. Conference of Senior Officials, supra note 115, at 180.
120. Gordon L. Weil, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, 57
AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 806 (1963) (describing Britain as "especially anxious to limit clearly the
extent of their commitment" under the Convention and observing that the practice mirrored
the policy it adopted toward the colonies).
121. Meetings of the Committee of Experts Held in Strasbourg from 2 to 8 February
1950 and 6 to 10 March 1950, reprinted in 4 COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 115, at 216; see
also Conference of Senior Officials, supra note 115, at 206, 242.
122. Committee of Experts: Feb.-Mar 1950, supra note 103, at 324 art. 7(d) ("The pro-
visions of this Convention shall be applied in the overseas territories with due regard,
however, to local requirements.").
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versions, however, contained the colonial clause framed in terms of legisla-
tive competence as quoted above.
23
To assist in deciding between the two alternative drafts, the Ministers
convened a Conference of Senior Officials that ultimately produced a single
Convention text and drew up a report. They were, however, "unable to come
to a unanimous decision on the most important of these problems, 124 among
which the colonial clause figured prominently. 25 At this Conference, the
United Kingdom proposed its own colonial clause permitting discretionary
declarations of extension to dependent territories:
Article 60 A
1) Any State may at the time of accession, or at any time thereafter,
declare by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe that the present Convention shall extend to all
or any of the territories for which it has international responsibil-
ity.
2) The Convention shall extend to the territory or territories named
in the notification as from the thirtieth day after the receipt of
this notification by the Secretary-General of the Council of Eu-
rope. 
1 26
As a result, the Convention now contained competing colonial clauses:
the United Kingdom's above proposal in 60 A, and an amalgam of the Bel-
gian "local requirements" clause and the "legislative competence" colonial
clause in 60 B:1
27
Article 60 B
1) The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in the over-
seas territories with due regard, however, to local requirements.
2) This Convention shall only apply to territories of the High Con-
tracting Parties possessing jurisdiction within the fields covered
by the present Convention when the consent of the appropriate
authorities of these territories has been obtained.
3) The High Contracting Parties responsible for these territories
shall, if necessary, take steps to obtain this consent.1
2 8
The net effect of the U.K. proposal was dramatic because of what it left
unstated. In effect, it wrought a fundamental change in the default geograph-
123. Id. at 334 (draft art. 52(48)); see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
124. Conference of Senior Officials, supra note 115, at 246.
125. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
126. Conference of Senior Officials, supra note 115, at 180-82, 238.




ic scope of the Convention with regard to the dependent territories. Instead
of impliedly including them in its ambit, it impliedly excluded them. Dis-
creetly framed in positive terms ("[a]ny state may ... declare . .. that the
present Convention shall extend"), 29 it operated to reverse the previously
expansive territorial application inclusive of dependencies. That expansive
interpretation is still evident in version 60 B, which takes for granted that
the provisions shall be applied in the overseas territories, providing the ca-
veat that they shall apply, "however,"'30 with possible limitations.
The contrasting provisions provoked a controversy of sorts that first
arose in the Assembly's Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions,
which expressed its own preference for draft Article 60 B-which by that
point had become Article 59 B-as "the more liberal solution.' 3' It sought
to resolve the situation by asking the Ministers to "find a way of overcoming
the constitutional objections raised by certain Members."'132 At that time,
Belgium proposed a compromise solution of adopting British version 59 A
but adding into it the "local requirements" as an additional subprovision. No
solution was forthcoming.
33
By this stage, a Subcommittee of Advisers had now placed the colonial
clause under a section titled "Provisions of the Draft Convention about
which agreement was not reached in the Sub-Committee,' 34 and, absurdly
exacerbating the indecision, it decided to present three alternative colonial
clauses to the Committee of Ministers. The first of these was the British
model and the second alternative was the Belgian model, both listed above.
The third alternative was a hybrid of the first two: it contained the British
declaration of extension, its thirty-day effect, and the Belgian "local re-
quirements" clause.'35 Ultimately, the Committee of Ministers unanimously
accepted a variant of this compromise on August 7, 1950, that would closely
resemble the final version:
Article 63:
1) Any State may at the time of its ratification or accession or at
any time thereafter declare by notification addressed to the Sec-
retary General of the Council of Europe that the present
129. Id.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Draft Articles 60 A and B later evolved, respectively, into draft Articles 59 A and B
during the Second Conference of Senior Officials on June 19, 1950. Conference of Senior Of-
ficials, supra note 115, at 100, 292-94; Meetings of the Committee on Legal and
Administrative Questions of the Consultative Assembly Held in Strasbourg, 23 and 24 June
1950, reprinted in 5 COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 47, at 2, 30.
132. Meetings of the Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions of the Consulta-
tive Assembly Held in Strasbourg, 23 and 24 June 1950, reprinted in 5 COUNCIL OF EUR.,
supra note 47, at 2, 30.
133. See Committee of Ministers: Fifth Session, supra note 88, at 50, 62.
134. Id. at 98-100.
135. Id. at 100-02.
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Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories of whose
international relations it is responsible.
2) The Convention shall extend to the territory or territories named
in the notification as from the thirtieth day after the receipt of
this notification by the Secretary General of the Council of Eu-
rope.
3) The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in the over-
seas territories with due regard, however, to local requirements.
4) Any State which has made a declaration in accordance with par-
agraph 1 of this Article may at any time thereafter declare on
behalf of one or more of those territories to which the Conven-
tion extends that it accepts the competence of the Commission to
receive petitions from individuals, non-governmental organisa-
tions or groups of individuals, in accordance with Article 25 of
the present Convention.
36
Rather dramatically, when the Consultative Assembly was asked to pro-
vide its views on the Ministers' draft Convention, it vociferously
condemned the colonial clause proposed by the Ministers. The Danish dele-
gate denounced the clause as unnecessarily exclusionary and an invitation to
Soviet criticism of the West,' 3 7 while the Italian delegate suggested that it
should be made into an automatic-application clause so that parties would
not have the option of excluding application to any of their territories.'38 Ld-
opold Senghor, a Senegalese anticolonialist and delegate of France,
articulated the fundamental problem:
Article 63 enables Member states to discriminate between territo-
ries under their jurisdiction, or more precisely, to exclude one or
several territories from the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
39
He then proceeded to relate former Article 63 to a more significant dif-
ficulty involving conflicts with other provisions, including Article 1:
I should like first of all to point out that this Article 63 runs counter
to the general principles of the Declaration of Human Rights and
particularly to Article 14 which condemns all discrimination, as al-
so to Article 1 which states that "the High Contracting Parties shall
136. Id. at 166-68.
137. See Consultative Assembly: Second Session Part One, supra note 47, at 240 (state-
ment of Den. Rep. Mr. Lannung).
138. See id. at 260 (statement of It. Rep. Mr. Persico).
139. Consultative Assembly: Aug. 1950, supra note 92, at 172.
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secure to each person within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms defined in Section 1 of this Convention."'"
Senghor went on to criticize the colonial clause on both legal and moral
grounds, emphasizing the absence of such a clause from the U.N. Declara-
tion and the Declaration of American States signed in Bogota.' 41 At a
practical level, he sought to warn against the potential support it would pro-
vide for Soviet criticism of the West and the dangerous resonance it might
have in Africa, which "cleaves more to the ideal of equality than to that of
independence.... There, Article 63 would be regarded as an affront to the
dignity of the overseas peoples.
1 42
The combined effect of these comments produced a majority opposition
to the clause in the Assembly, which voted by forty-six to thirty-seven to de-
lete the provision. 43 It is not known which aspects of the clause proved
most objectionable, but Senghor's comment about its irreconcilability with
Article 1 represents the only mention of this conflict in the Travaux Pr6pa-
ratoires; therefore, whether it was received as an obscure technical point of
minor importance or as a compelling insight only just discerned remains un-
clear. In any event, such criticisms carried more weight in the Assembly
than in the Committee of Ministers, who chose to override the Assembly's
views on the matter. Thus, despite the Assembly's damning rejection of Ar-
ticle 63, it was retained in the final draft by the Committee of Ministers.44
Today, despite Senghor's unusually prescient observation of the ineluctable
conflict between former Article 63 and Article 1, the two provisions contin-
ue to sit uneasily alongside one another in the Convention, the former firmly
anchored to its colonial roots and rigidly literal application as if frozen in
time, the latter expanding and contracting uncomfortably in an effort to find
a coherent limit to Convention obligations. 145 The subsequent jurisprudential
developments of these two provisions now serve to confirm an incompatibil-
ity first noticed nearly sixty years ago.
C. Article 1 Drafting History
The debate and controversy surrounding the colonial clause has yielded
only a modest body of conservative and static jurisprudence, a phenomenon
more readily explained by its near obsolescence today than by particularly
incisive drafting. In contrast, the sweeping and ambiguous scope of the
Convention's Article 1 application "to each person within the jurisdiction"
has yielded a vast and dynamic body of jurisprudence quite inversely pro-
portionate to the scant debates to which it gave rise in the negotiations.
140. Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 176.
143. Id. at 182.
144. See ECHR art. 56.
145. See infra Part H1L
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As noted above, the earliest form of a draft European Convention was
produced by the European Movement, which conceived of the Convention
as applying in territorial terms, requiring each party to guarantee the Con-
vention rights "to all persons within its territory."' 14 6 After the establishment
of the Council of Europe, this formulation was modified in the early draft
put forward by the Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions of the
Consultative Assembly, where Article 2 framed the obligation as extending
"to all persons residing within their territories." '147
The draft article was then reviewed by the Committee of Experts, which
found the emphasis on persons residing in the territory to be too narrow. As
a result, it proposed to replace the words "residing in" with the words "with-
in its jurisdiction"-a phrase at that time found in the draft U.N. human
rights covenant: 1
48
Since the aim of this [Article 2] amendment is to widen as far as
possible the categories of persons who are to benefit by the guaran-
tee contained in the Convention, and since the words "living in"
might give rise to a certain ambiguity, the Sub-Committee proposes
that the Committee should adopt the text contained in the draft
Covenant of the United Nations Commission: that is, to replace the
words "residing within" by "within its jurisdiction."'49
On this basis, the provision was redrafted as Article 1:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to guarantee to all persons
within their jurisdiction the rights listed. 50
This was subsequently slightly modified to replace "guarantee" with "ac-
cord to any person within their jurisdiction." 5'
The language was again modified so that "any person" became "every-
one," and the current language of Article 1 was eventually adopted. 5 2 The
146. Draft ECHR, supra note 98, at 296.
147. Consultative Assembly: First Session, supra note 99, at 228 (emphasis added); Eur.
Consult. Ass., First Session of the Consultative Assembly Held in Strasbourg, 10 August to 8
September 1949, reprinted in 2 COUNCIL OF EUR., COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX
PR9PARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2, 276 (1975).
148. One of the documents reviewed by the Committee of Experts was a preparatory re-
port by the Secretariat General concerning a preliminary draft convention. The document,
which was undated, provided a collective guarantee of human rights and compared the draft
international covenant on human rights with the Consultative Assembly draft. With regard to
Article 2, it observed: "This [U.N. covenant] article guarantees all individuals within the
State's jurisdiction the rights defined. Article 2 of the Strasbourg draft provides that the Mem-
ber States shall undertake to ensure to all persons residing within their territories the rights
defined." Working Papers Prepared by the Secretariat General for the Committee of Experts
(Undated), reprinted in 3 COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 103, at 2, 26.
149. Committee of Experts: Feb.-Mar 1950, supra note 103, at 200.
150. Id. at 222.
151. Id. at 236.
152. See ECHR art. 1.
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Committee reiterated the reasons for the semantic change a few weeks later,
observing:
It seemed to the Committee that the term "residing" might be con-
sidered too restrictive. It was felt that there were good grounds
for extending the benefits of the Convention to all persons in the
territories of the signatory States, even those who could not be
considered as residing there in the legal sense of the word. This
word, moreover, has not the same meaning in all national laws. The
Committee therefore replaced the term "residing" by the words
"within their jurisdiction," which are also contained in Article 2 of
the Draft Covenant of the United Nations Commission.
153
Taken together, these comments highlight a critical premise for the
drafters that directly challenges today's expansively extraterritorial
interpretations of the provision. Although the modem jurisprudential gloss
on Article 1 reveals a preoccupation with its bearing on the extraterritorial
scope of the Convention, 154 the drafting history clearly indicates that the
drafters' intent in replacing "residing in the territory" with "in the
jurisdiction," was decidedly not to expand the territorial scope of the
Convention, but rather its personal scope. What mattered, and what proved
persuasive as far as the drafters were concerned, was that coverage to
persons "within the jurisdiction" was more expansive because it covered all
persons in the territory, regardless of their formal status as permanent
resident, temporary migrant, or tourist. When taken together with Article 56,
the drafting history militates against an interpretation that the Convention's
geographic scope was originally intended to be expansive; on the contrary, it
was conceived as territorially limited.
D. Drafting History Summary
An analysis of the drafting history of these territorial provisions gives
rise to several conclusions. The first is that former Article 63, by permitting
optional extension of the Convention to colonial territories, represented a
significant regression from the early visions of uniform Convention
application throughout the colonies. The practical result is an instrument
that formally excludes all colonial territories unless steps are taken via the
provision to expressly include them.
Where no declarations of extension under Article 56 are made, the
scope of the Convention ratione loci appears to be strictly limited to the
metropolitan territories of the contracting parties. This is indicated by the
fact that under Article 56(1) parties "may ... declare .. . that the present
Convention shall ... extend to all or any of the territories for whose
153. Committee of Experts: Feb.-Mar 1950, supra note 103, at 260.
154. See infra Parts III.B-HI.E.
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international relations it is responsible." 15 5 Such a provision exemplifies the
exception to the rule in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties that, "[ulnless a different intention appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its
entire territory." 156 In the Convention context, the optional extension under
Article 56 constitutes precisely such a "different intention."
Reluctance to provide the Soviets with a further opportunity to criticize
the West constituted an additional basis for opposition to the colonial clause.
Pure anticolonial sentiments and the seeming incompatibility of such a pro-
vision in a human rights instrument emerged as other reasons. Throughout
the extensive debates on former Article 63, however, it was only the Senega-
lese anticolonialist Senghor who raised what has today become its
overriding defect: its glaring incompatibility with Article L" As he ob-
served nearly sixty years ago, if Article 1 obliges parties to secure
Convention rights to each person "within their jurisdiction," how could for-
mer Article 63 create a presumption of their exclusion from the
dependencies? In other words, how can Articles 1 and 56 be reconciled? To-
day, commentators have examined three possible relationships: that Article
56 operates to restrict Article 1 jurisdiction, that Article 56 operates to
broaden Article 1 jurisdiction, or that Article 56 performs a combination of
these two functions.
158
The first option is that Article 56 operates to limit the scope of Article 1
jurisdiction to metropolitan territories only. In other words, it is because of
the exclusionary nature of Article 56 that Article 1 jurisdiction must be con-
strued as confined only to the parties' metropolitan territory. Under such a
reading, the two provisions are construed so as to avoid any conflict in their
interaction with one another. This option was likely not the interpretation
taken by Senghor, unless his opposition to the conflicting provisions was
grounded in the inevitable effect that such a reading would produce. In other
words, he may have opposed Article 56 for the precise reason that it would
restrict Article I jurisdiction to metropolitan territories only, subject to a
contrary declaration.
Under the second reading, Article 56 operates to expand Article 1 juris-
diction from a metropolitan-only scope to one capable of encompassing
dependent territories. Certainly its provisions enable the Convention to ex-
tend to dependencies, but a strict reading of Article 56 as expanding Article
1 would overlook its primary role of impliedly limiting the Convention.
155. ECHR art. 56(1).
156. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 29, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added).
157. See supra Part ll.B.
158. MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREA-
TIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY 15-16 (2011); Moor & Simpson, supra note 39, at 121
(concluding that Article 56 likely embraces both a restrictive and expansive function).
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This leaves a third option of a possible dual function. Because Article
56 is framed in positive terms-"may declare that the Convention shall ex-
tend"-it presumptively implies a scope limited to metropolitan territories
only. Were Article 56 framed conversely-"may declare that the Convention
shall not extend"-the presumption would be reversed, and the implication
would then be one of default Convention application to metropolitan and
dependent territories. As it stands, the presumptive limitation of the Conven-
tion to the metropolitan territories created by Article 56 must be read as both
limiting the concept of Article 1 and of enabling its exceptional territorial
expansion. Article 56 can thus be seen to operate somewhat like a switch:
suppressing application of the Convention to the dependencies unless specif-
ically activated by means of an express declaration. Once activated by
Article 56, the territories are then brought within the ambit of the Conven-
tion's Article 1 jurisdiction. Below, it is suggested that this interpretation
constitutes not only the appropriate reading of the two provisions, but one
that is confirmed by the Convention's case law. 159
It is more likely that the source of Senghor's unease originated in his
understanding of the term "jurisdiction," taken as it was directly from the
draft U.N. Covenant on Human Rights at the time.160 But regardless of what
meaning the Covenant's jurisdiction clause may have had in 1950, it would
have been of little assistance-or relevance-in reconciling the scope of
Article 1 with that of Article 56. Already by that time, the controversy
surrounding colonial clauses had taken hold in the United Nations and had
become a source of bitter debate with regard to that draft instrument.
161
Within just four months of Senghor's eloquent plea to delete former Article
63 from the European Convention, the U.N. General Assembly would issue
a resolution to the same effect, calling upon the Commission on Human
Rights to automatically extend the covenant "equally to a signatory
metropolitan State and to all the territories, be they Non-Self-Governing,
Trust or Colonial Territories, which are being administered or governed by
such metropolitan State. ' 162 Ultimately, the U.N. covenants to emerge from
that process would be stripped of colonial clauses,163 suggesting at least that
159. See infra Part tI.E. But see the recent characterization of Article 56 as comprising
situations "separate and distinct" from those arising under ECA jurisdiction. AI-Skeini v.
United Kingdom, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, 140 (2011).
160. U.N. Secretary-General, Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and
Measures of Implementation: The Federal Clause: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 23, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/651 (Mar. 17, 1952) [hereinafter Draft Covenant on Human Rights].
161. See, e.g., 1951 Draft Convention on the Status of Refugees, supra note 76; U.N.
Secretary-General, Rep. of the Commission on Human Rights: Federal and Colonial Clauses,
U.N. Doc. E1721 (June 19, 1950); Economic and Social Questions, 1950 U.N.Y.B. 438, 519-
25, U.N. Sales No. 1951.1.24.
162. G.A. Res. 422 (V), at 43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/422(V) (Dec. 4, 1950).
163. The U.N. covenants had previously contained a provision automatically extending
covenant rights to all dependent territories. This was "attacked" by the Soviet Union and
former colonies as "implicitly endors[ing] ... colonialism" and was ultimately eliminated
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the jurisdiction clause in Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights 64 would not be construed along the same lines as
Article 1 of the ECHR. Instead, as a result of the Committee of Ministers'
decision to retain the colonial clause, the scope of the European
Convention's territorial application would be forever governed by two
provisions whose interaction would ultimately be a matter for judicial
determination.
This Part has sought to demonstrate that former Article 63 represents a
significant regression from the early visions of uniform Convention applica-
tion by permitting the optional extension of the Convention to dependencies.
The practical result is an instrument that formally excludes all colonial terri-
tories unless steps are taken via the provision to expressly include them. It
has also shown that the drafters' objective underlying Article 1 was to ex-
pand the Convention's personal scope as widely as possible within parties'
territorial sphere.
III. JURISPRUDENCE
A. Early Case Law on Article 56
Article 56 governs the extension of the Convention to "territories for
whose international relations . .. [a state party] is responsible," but the
phrase is not defined, leaving the task to the judicial bodies of the Conven-
tion.1 65 As noted earlier, the Commission had, by 1961, determined that the
phrase had "succeeded other, more restrictive terms employed such as 'col-
onies,' or 'non-metropolitan areas"' and therefore constituted a broad
catchall term designed to accommodate all dependencies regardless of spe-
cific legal status or designation. 166 The Commission went on to observe that
"this change represents an effort to facilitate, although without rendering
compulsory, the application of the more important international treaties to
territories the status of which is as varied as it is changeable but without as-
signing a final degree of importance to any one such status." '167 At first
glance, this comment manages to convey the drafters' intent to make the
Convention capable of application to the entire diverse array of dependent
territories regardless of their specific legal status. Upon closer reading, how-
ever, the comment is wholly noncommittal; it merely asserts that such
altogether in the Third Committee in 1966. Robert Starr, International Protection of Human
Rights and the United Nations Covenants, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 863, 872.
164. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; accord International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
165. See ECHR art. 56.





"territories" encompass a diverse array of dependencies without either dis-
tinguishing them or settling upon a precise term of reference that might help
to define them. Aside from confirming the expansive character of the phrase,
the Commission ultimately failed to clarify what characteristics such "terri-
tories" might have, or how they might be identified. As shall be seen, the
issue of identifying and distinguishing the features of Article 56 territories
became more difficult as the decolonization process accelerated and the
prevalence of colonies declined.
1. Article 56(1): "Territories for Whose International Relations...
[the State Party] Is Responsible"
Rather unsurprisingly, the determination as to whether a particular terri-
tory was one "for whose international relations ... [a state party] is
responsible" was a relatively straightforward inquiry in the early days of the
Convention. In such cases, the objectively colonial character of a territory
was capable of overriding its constitutional status as an integral part of the
metropolitan territory.1 68 Thus, in the case of X v. Belgium, the Commission
found it "manifest" that the Congo qualified as one of the "territories for
whose international relations" Belgium was responsible. At the same time, it
considered that any special status the Congo may have enjoyed under Bel-
gium's municipal legal system was entirely "superfluous" to the analysis. 16 9
In more recent postcolonial times, however, the inquiry became more
difficult, and the status of certain territories left room for ambiguity: How,
for example, were noncolonial dependencies to be treated? Or those in the
European space? In such instances, the Commission demonstrated greater
flexibility and restraint than in its unilateral determination of traditional co-
lonial territories such as the Belgian Congo. As will be discussed in the
following paragraphs, the Commission has shown itself more willing to de-
fer to the contracting party in determining a territory's status, usually by
reference to Article 56 declarations, without any independent determination
of the status of such territories. In deferring to the contracting party with re-
gard to the status of a European territory, the Commission and the Court
have recognized an Article 56 declaration as prima facie proof of the status
of the territory as one for whose international relations the contracting party
is responsible.
Accordingly, when a resident of Jersey, located in the United King-
dom's Channel Islands, alleged a violation of Article 3 of the First Protocol
based on an inability to vote in U.K. parliamentary elections (notwithstand-
ing the United Kingdom's parliamentary jurisdiction over Jersey), the
Commission found that the existence of a former Article 63 declaration was
conclusive proof of Jersey's status as a nonmetropolitan territory, a finding
168. Id. (holding alleged violations arising in the Belgian Congo inadmissible for lack of
Article 56 declaration extending the Convention to the Belgian Congo, notwithstanding Bel-
gium's domestic legal treatment of the Congo as part of its metropolitan territory).
169. Id.
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that informed the merits of the case since it had bearing on whether or not
the applicant was a U.K. resident.170 The Commission observed:
The specific constitutional status of Jersey has been recognised
in the system of the European Convention on Human Rights be-
cause the Convention was formally extended to Jersey under Article
63 of the Convention. This reflects the fact that Jersey is treated as a
territory for whose international relations the United Kingdom is
responsible but which does not, in itself, form part of the United
Kingdom.
17 1
Curiously, while emphasizing the relevance of the United Kingdom's decla-
ration under former Article 63, the Commission failed to take the next step
of assessing whether or not the United Kingdom had ever issued a declara-
tion of extension under the First Protocol's nearly identical colonial
clause. 172 When the same issue arose four years later with regard to Guern-
sey, the Court did not overlook this requirement.
73
Just as a party's Article 56 declaration can conclusively establish the
status of such territories, so too does it inform the existence of parallel dec-
laration requirements under the Convention's protocols. In Gillow v. United
Kingdom, for example, the European Court relied on a statement by the
United Kingdom as to the status of Guernsey with regard to the First Proto-
col:
[T]he Court has ascertained that a statement concerning the position
of the Channel Islands in relation to treaties and international
agreements applicable to the United Kingdom was issued on behalf
of the Government of the United Kingdom on 16 October 1950 and
170. X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8873/80, 28 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 99,
104-05 (1982).
171. Id.; see also X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7202nl5, 7 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 102, 102-03 (1976) (finding admissible an individual complaint nearly one year after
Britain's declaration under former Article 63(4) on grounds of an allegedly continuing viola-
tion).
172. See First Protocol, supra note 54, art. 4 (showing that although the United Kingdom
ratified the First Protocol on Nov. 3, 1952, it had not issued a declaration under that Protocol);
Council of Eur. Treaty Office, List of Declarations Made with Respect to Treaty No. 009,
COUNCIL OF EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?
NT=009&CM=7&DF=15/04/2010&CL=ENG&VL=I (last visited July 6, 2012) (indicating
that Britain's first declaration of extension to the Bailiwick of Jersey was not made until Feb-
ruary 22, 1988, several years after the complaint at issue here). That no earlier declaration of
extension to Jersey was made under the First Protocol was confirmed by email correspondence
to the author from the Council of Europe's Legal Advice Department and Treaty Office. Email
from the Webmaster, Legal Advice Dep't & Treaty Office, Directorate of Legal Advice & Pub-
lic Int'l Law, Council of Eur., to Barbara Miltner (Apr. 15, 2010, 00:46 PDT) (on file with
author). The Commission's lack of treatment of this provision would therefore appear to be an
oversight, though of minimal relevance given its decision that the application was manifestly
ill founded.
173. See Gillow v. United Kingdom, 109 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
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communicated to all foreign Governments with whom the United
Kingdom Government were in diplomatic relations, the United Na-
tions and other international organisations concerned, including,
inter alia, the Council of Europe. It was thereby established that the
island of Guernsey should be regarded as a "territory for the inter-
national relations of which [the United Kingdom] is responsible"
for the purposes of treaty provisions in the terms of Article 4 of this
Protocol (P1-4); and this practice has been followed with regard to
treaties concluded within the framework of the Council of Europe,
including the Convention (Article 63). 74
In Gillow, the United Kingdom's declaration as to the status of the Isle
of Guernsey, both generally and under Article 63, contributed to the Court's
decision to require a declaration of extension under the First Protocol and to
find that Protocol entirely inapplicable where such a declaration was lack-
ing. 175 That the Court chose to emphasize this general U.K. statement
alongside the subsequent Article 63 declaration further underscores the ex-
tent to which territorial status under the Convention and its protocols is
viewed as originating with the contracting party's own determinations, at
least inasmuch as European noncolonial territories are concerned.
It is through such deferential judicial practices that Article 56 has come
to have broad application even within the European sphere. As a result, the
Convention has been applied, by operation of Article 56, to the territories of
the Isle of Man, 176 Guernsey, 177 Jersey, 178 and Gibraltar, 179 notwithstanding
their European locale and noncolonial status.
2. Articles 56(1) and 56(4): The Declaration Requirements
Perhaps the clearest rule to emerge from Article 56 jurisprudence per-
tains to the declaration requirements found under Articles 56(1) and 56(4).
Under these provisions, the Convention and the right of individual applica-
tion, respectively, will extend to the relevant territory upon a state party's
express declaration to do so. Other expressions of intent or domestic
174. Id. at 21 62 (emphasis added).
175. See id. Ironically, the absence of such a declaration and the claims it barred under
Gillow may have been unintentional. It has been suggested that the United Kingdom's failure
to extend the First Protocol to the Channel Islands in 1953 (at the time it extended the Conven-
tion there) was the result of oversight. See SIMPSON, supra note 72, at 842 n.107.
176. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, In 38-39 (1978).
177. See Gillow, 109 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (finding a breach of Article 8 of the
Convention, implying that the Convention was applied to Guernsey by operation of Article
56); Wiggins v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 40, 48 (1978) (implicitly
assuming application of the Convention via former Article 63).
178. X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8873/80, 28 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 99,
104-05 (1982); X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7202/75, 7 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
102, 102-03 (1976).
179. Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1991-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 250, 1 19.
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treatment of it as metropolitan territory are insufficient' I-both the Com-
mission and the Court have consistently required strict adherence to the
presence of a former Article 63 declaration for dependent territories. In
1977, for example, the Commission ruled an application from Dominica
nonjusticiable on grounds that the United Kingdom's Article 63(4) declara-
tion granting a right of individual application had expired a mere two
months prior to the application's submission. 8 The stringency of the Com-
mission's application of former Article 63 with regard to the more
traditionally "colonial" territories can however, in rare instances, be con-
trasted with somewhat greater flexibility where European dependencies are
involved. Such was the case in Jersey when a two-year-old claim was resur-
rected and held admissible after the British authorities made retroactive
declarations extending the Convention and the right of individual petition
there some two years after the original complaint was filed. 82 The Com-
mission held that the issuance of an Article 56 declaration can resurrect a
formerly invalid claim where the applicant has pursued his application
since the declaration's date of effect, and where allegations involve con-
tinuing acts.'83 This case marks an atypical accommodation of Article 56
that is, for the most part, strictly applied, as this Subsection demonstrates.
A 2008 House of Lords judgment undertook an even narrower reading
of Article 56 declarations in finding that they apply "to a political entity and
not to the land which is from time to time comprised in its territory."1 84 As a
result, although the British-held Chagos Islands had once enjoyed a declara-
tion of extension under Article 56 when the territories comprised part of the
Mauritius Islands, the declaration ceased to have effect in the territory in
1965 when the islands were excised from Mauritius and administratively re-
constituted to form part of the British Indian Ocean Territories, to which the
Convention was never extended. 85 According to a majority of the House of
Lords, the Convention ceased to apply following the Chagos Islands' rein-
180. Compare X v. Belgium, App. No. 1065161, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 260,264-
70 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (finding that the Convention and First Protocol did not extend to
the Congo where Belgium passed a domestic law extending jurisdiction but "ultimately made
none of the declarations"), with Piermont v. France, 314 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 44
(1995) (noting that France made a formal declaration when depositing an instrument of
ratification that the Convention protocol it ratified would apply to Polynesia), and Py v.
France, 2005-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 59 (noting that France made a formal declaration when
depositing instruments of ratification to extend the Convention and First Protocol to New
Caledonia).
181. X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7444/76, 11 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 111,
112 (1977).
182. X. v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 102-03.
183. Id.
184. R (on the Application of Bancoult) v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commw.
Affairs, [2008] UKHL 61 [64] (appeal taken from Eng.).
185. This is to be distinguished from the invalidity of Article 56 declarations to territory
that becomes independent, which was recognized long ago. See X v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 3813/68, 1970 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 586, 596 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
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carnation in 1965 as "a new political entity."' 86 If the U.K. House of Lords'
interpretation on the matter is correct, then the Convention's application is
not only limited to territories benefiting from an express Article 56 declara-
tion, but is further limited to exclude any territories that have undergone a
transformation into a new, albeit still dependent, political entity.
8 7
B. Early Case Law on Article 1
From a relatively early stage, Convention jurisprudence began to indicate
that Article 1 had some bearing on the Convention's extraterritorial scope.
These instances involved allegations of a party violating the Convention with
regard to actions taken outside its traditionally territorial frontiers. The earliest
examination of the Convention's potentially extraterritorial application arose
in 1965 in relation to a complaint against the Federal Republic of Germany
regarding its consular and embassy officials in Morocco. 88 In that case, an
individual alleged that German consular officials undertook to have Moroc-
can officials secure his deportation from that country. 189 Although the
complaint was ultimately deemed inadmissible as manifestly ill founded, the
Commission commented obiter that:
Whereas it is true that the Applicant attributes his deportation to
unwarranted intrigues against him conducted by the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany with the Moroccan authorities; Whereas under
Article 1 of the Convention "the High Contracting Parties shall se-
cure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in Section I of [the] Convention"; Whereas, in certain re-
spects, the nationals of a Contracting State are within its
'jurisdiction" even when domiciled or resident abroad; whereas, in
particular, the diplomatic and consular representatives of their
country of origin perform certain duties with regard to them which
may, in certain circumstances, make that country liable in respect of
the Convention; Whereas, however, the Commission notes that the
Applicant has not furnished sufficient proof in support of his allega-
tions .... 190
This decision represents the first recognition by the Commission that
the Convention may "in certain respects" be capable of extraterritorial
application. Even then, the comment was elaborately circumscribed:
delivered only as obiter dicta; carefully limited to the factual context of
diplomatic or consular representatives abroad; and subjected to multiple
186. R (on the Application of Bancoult) v. Sec'y of State, [2008] UKHL at [64].
187. As of July 2012 this case is still pending before the European Court of Human
Rights.
188. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 1611/62, 1965 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on
H.R. 158 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
189. Id. at 162-64.
190. Id. at 166-68 (emphasis added).
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cautionary caveats-"certain duties ... which may, in certain
circumstances" trigger Convention obligations.19'
The issue of the Convention's extraterritorial application would not re-
surface for another decade, when the Commission would affirm its position
in much more general terms. In 1975, the wife of Rudolph Hess, former Na-
zi deputy under Hitler, submitted an application against the United Kingdom
seeking his release from life imprisonment in the Allied Military prison in
Berlin-Spandau, located in the British sector of Berlin. 192 Citing its 1965
Moroccan consular precedent, the Commission recognized that although the
case involved territory outside the United Kingdom, "a State is under certain
circumstances responsible under the Convention for actions of its authorities
outside its territory."'
93
Finding that "there is in principle, from a legal point of view, no reason
why acts of the British authorities in Berlin should not entail the liability of
the United Kingdom under the Convention,' ' 94 the Commission proceeded
to examine whether Britain was constrained by Convention obligations in its
role in the prison operations. What it concluded was a very tightly reasoned
set of findings justifying its decision that the case was inadmissible on two
grounds. First, it found that Spandau prison was governed by the Allied
Kommandatura, which consisted of "four governors acting by unanimous
decisions," and that its administration was "at all times quadripartite," as be-
tween the United Kingdom and the other three Allied Powers. 195 On this
ground, the Commission held that
the joint authority cannot be divided into four separate jurisdictions
and that therefore the United Kingdom's participation in the exer-
cise of the joint authority and consequently in the administration
and supervision of Spandau Prison is not a matter "within the juris-
diction" of the United Kingdom, within the meaning of Art. 1 of the
Convention.'96
The Commission therefore found that Hess was not within Britain's Article
1 jurisdiction ratione personae. There was a further reason given, however,
that compounded the inadmissibility finding and that related to the temporal
scope of the claim. The Commission noted that the agreement establishing
the Allied Kommandatura significantly predated the entry into force of the
Convention, and it commented obiter dicta that it "could raise an issue under
191. Id. at 168.
192. Hess v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6231/73, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72,
72 (1975).
193. Id. at 73.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 74.
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the Convention if it were entered into when the Convention was already in
force for the respondent Government."'
97
Within two years, a third extraterritorial claim under the Convention
opened up a new possible circumstance for its application: belligerent
military occupation by a state party. Cyprus v. Turkey arose in response to
Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus and its commencement of military
occupation there. 198 In a decision that would fundamentally broaden the
Convention's extraterritorial application beyond traditionally recognized
bases of consular jurisdiction and wartime occupation, the Commission
rejected Turkey's argument that Article 1 extraterritorial jurisdiction was
narrowly limited to a formal territorial annexation or to the establishment of
a military or civil government. 199 Instead, the Commission articulated a
general rule governing extraterritorial bases for Convention application:
[T]hat nationals of a State, including registered ships and aircrafts,
are partly within its jurisdiction wherever they may be, and that au-
thorised agents of a State, including diplomatic or consular agents
and armed forces, not only remain under its jurisdiction when
abroad but bring any other persons or property "within the jurisdic-
tion" of that State, to the extent that they exercise authority over
such persons or property. Insofar as, by the acts or omissions, they
affect such persons or property, the responsibility of the State is en-
gaged.2°°
This decision represents a shift from the Commission's previously cir-
cumscribed attempts to narrowly frame the grounds for extraterritorial
application on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the Commission declared an
expansive general rule delineating the circumstances under which the Con-
vention may apply extraterritorially. This rule is largely drawn from the
concept of jurisdiction as a general legal principle,20 1 according to which a
state may exercise jurisdiction over its nationals beyond the frontiers of its
own territory under narrowly crafted exceptions that include nationals of a
state, including aircraft or vessels, and authorized agents, whether diplomat-
ic or military. 202 Yet it also articulated a new ground, with slightly more
197. Id.
198. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
125, 127 (1975).
199. Id. at 136.
200. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
201. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 306-16
(6th ed. 2003).
202. Id. at 308, 312-15. Reliance on the ordinary meaning of jurisdiction as a general
legal principle was made explicit in Bankovi6, where the Court observed that "from the stand-
point of public international law," a state's competence is "primarily territorial," given that
instances of extraterritorial jurisdiction are, "as a general rule, defined and limited by the sov-
ereign territorial rights of the other relevant States." Bankovid v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 333, 1 59.
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attenuated jurisdictional links to the member state: persons or property over
whom authorized agents exercise authority. While the decision avoided any
findings on the merits, it concluded that the armed forces were authorized
agents of Turkey, which was sufficient to establish admissibility. 03
Cyprus v. Turkey thus represented the first instance in which the
extraterritorial application of the Convention was affirmatively recognized
in the factual circumstances of a given case. As such, the unusually
expansive nature of the ruling made it that much more remarkable. But
given the dicta of the earlier decisions laying the foundation for Cyprus v.
Turkey, it was likely intended as a merely incremental broadening of the
principles already established. If the actions of diplomatic personnel abroad
could theoretically involve Article 1 jurisdiction, and nonexclusive control
of an Allied military prison abroad could do the same, then how could the
belligerent territorial occupation of another Council of Europe member state
not give rise to Article 1 jurisdiction? The factual circumstances may have
been too compelling to ignore.
Another issue that may have contributed to the Commission's decision
was Turkey's reliance on former Article 63 to deny the presence of Article 1
jurisdiction. Turkey argued that because former Article 63 governed the de-
pendent territories, Article I jurisdiction was by extension necessarily limited
to metropolitan territory only.2" Therefore, Turkey argued, it could not have
possibly exercised Article 1 jurisdiction in Cyprus, since Cyprus did not con-
stitute any part of its metropolitan territory.0 5 As discussed above, this
argument is, at least in theory, a rational one, permitting the two provisions
to be read in harmony with one another. When used as a justification for
preventing Convention obligations from applying to a situation of overt ter-
ritorial aggression leading to human rights abuses, however, it was roundly
rejected by the Commission. 06 With this case, Article 1 jurisdiction was ex-
panded for the first time beyond the traditional bases for extraterritoriality
such as flag vessels, embassies, or a country's nationals abroad; instead Ar-
ticle 1 jurisdiction extended "to all persons under ... [a member state's]
203. Cyprus, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 136.
204. Id. at 130.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 136-37. The Commission's reasons, however, amounted to semantic hairsplit-
ting: it argued that former Article 63 was not narrowly confined to the notion of Convention
extension to dependencies because the provision in 63(3) also affected the material application
of provisions in such territory. Further, the Commmission argued that the Convention was also
capable of extension beyond dependencies in situations of extraterritoriality along the lines of
Hess. Hess v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6273/73, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72
(1975); see X v. Switzerland, App. Nos. 7289/75, 7349/76, 9 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
57 (1977). See also supra notes 192-197 and accompanying text; infra note 214. However, the
fact that Article 1 jurisdiction was predominantly limited to metropolitan territories and that
Article 63 was predominantly concerned with the Convention's extension to the dependencies
was not diminished by these minor exceptions. From a policy standpoint, it might have been
more prudent for the Commission to concede the argument in theory but block its application
by implementing the principle of estoppel.
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actual authority and responsibility, whether that authority is exercised within
their own territory or abroad.""2 7 As will be discussed below, the basis for
Article 1 jurisdiction in Cyprus v. Turkey would prove to be a difficult
ground to confine. 20 8 It would also expose the poorly conceived relationship
between Article 1 and Article 56.
The more conventional factual circumstances giving rise to the extrater-
ritorial application of the Convention would not emerge until long after
Cyprus v. Turkey. These include acts of diplomatic or consular agents exer-
cising their authority in respect of persons2°9 and acts of nationals of a
state,21 0 including registered vessels.21  Many of these were later recatego-
rized as examples of SAA over persons in Al-Skeini.
2 12
Another line of cases involving the extraterritorial application of the
Convention established the so-called indirect effects doctrine pertaining to
extradition and expulsion decisions giving rise to extraterritorial Article 3
violations. Thus, the United Kingdom's decision to extradite an applicant
facing a possible risk of execution and exposure to the U.S. "death row phe-
nomenon" was deemed to constitute an Article 3 violation.213 This line of
cases has since been distinguished from other types of extraterritorial appli-
cation and will not be discussed here.
214
207. Cyprus, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 136.
208. See infra Part IHI.C.
209. M. v. Denmark, App. No. 17392/90, 73 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 193, 196
(1992); X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8081/77, 12 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 207,
207-08 (1977).
210. Rantsev v. Cyprus, App. No. 25965/04, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, J 208 (2010).
211. See, e.g., Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 899, H7
(2010); Xhavara v. Italy, App. No. 39473/98, at *5 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i--001-31884.
212. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, 133-
137 (2011).
213. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32, 35 (1989) (limiting
extraterritorial scope of Article 3 to substantial grounds for a real risk of harm having a direct
causal connection to the expulsion).
214. This line of extradition and expulsion cases does not entail Article I extraterritorial
jurisdiction given that
the decision to extradite is normally taken in the territory of the extraditing state, at
a moment when the person concerned is clearly within that state's jurisdiction....
Accordingly Soering does not provide authority for the statement that the concept
of "jurisdiction" is not restricted to the national territory of the contracting parties.
Lawson, supra note 21, at 97. Similarly, cases involving state immunity or the granting of ex-
equatur to foreign judgments may also have an "extraterritorial element" but are not relevant
to Article I jurisdiction. See O'Boyle, supra note 21, at 126-27. However, other case law and
commentary continue to treat extradition and expulsion cases without distinction. See, e.g.,
Bankovi6 v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 68; Elspeth Berry, The Extraterritorial
Reach of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 EuR. PuB. L. 629, 632-33 (2006);
Miller, supra note 69, at 1242.
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C. From Expansion to Bankovi6: Two Steps
Forward, One Step Back?
The extension of Article 1 jurisdiction to SAA over persons, established
in Cyprus v. Turkey, would eventually give rise to a prolific line of cases
nearly all involving Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. These cases af-
firmed and expanded the Convention's extraterritorial application through a
progressively expansive construction of Article 1 jurisdiction. SAA over
persons as a basis for Article 1 jurisdiction was not only affirmed,2 5 but also
incrementally enlarged to encompass specific factual circumstances where
the existing articulation of Article 1 would be otherwise inadequate. In this
way, SAA over persons expanded to accommodate control or authority by
private individuals where state "acquiescence or connivance" could be es-
tablished 216 and where authorized state agents could be shown to have
prevented a third state from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory.
217
These highly attenuated causal relationships between the state and the harm
complained of eventually gave rise to a significantly new basis for establish-
ing extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Convention.
Article 1 jurisdiction eventually expanded to include instances where, as
a consequence of military action-whether lawful or unlawful-a state ex-
ercises "effective overall control" over part of a territory beyond its frontiers
even where SAA over persons cannot be established.218 This broadening of
the doctrine of extraterritorial application of the Convention was not without
controversy. One dissenting judge, for example, criticized the expansiveness
of the rule on grounds that it conflated the Convention's jurisdiction ratione
personae with its jurisdiction ratione loci:
The present judgment breaks with the previous case law since in
dealing with the question whether there was jurisdiction ratione
215. See, e.g., Chrysostomos v. Turkey, App. Nos. 15299/89, 15300/89, 15318/89, 68
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 216, 245 (1991); Vearncombe v. United Kingdom, App. No.
12816/87, 59 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 186, 194 (1989).
216. Isaak v. Turkey, App. No. 44587/98, at *14, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i--001-77533 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006); Ilascu v. Moldova, 2004-VH Eur. Ct.
H.R. 179, 318; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 81. For the suggestion that the
"acquiescence or connivance" test may be less a separate ground of Article 1 jurisdiction "than
a device for significantly broadening the existing 'authority and control over persons' test" to
include instances of indirect control, see Barbara Miltner, Case Comment, Broadening the
Scope of Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights?, 2007
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 172, 179, 184, 194 (2007).
217. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 8007n77, 13 Eur. Comn'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 85, 150
(1978).
218. Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 231, 22-23; Eugenia Michaelidou
Dev. Ltd v. Turkey, App. No. 16163/90, at *5 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61271; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct.
H.R. 76-77; Loizidou v. Turkey (Loizidou 11), App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513,




personae it applies the criteria for determining whether there was
jurisdiction ratione loci, although the conditions for doing so have
not been met. Thus, for the first time, the Court is passing judgment
on an international law situation which lies outside the ambit of the
powers conferred on it under the Convention's supervision machin-
ery. In this judgment the Court projects Turkey's legal system onto
northern Cyprus without concerning itself with the political and le-
gal consequences of such an approach." 9
This dissent suggests that Article 1 jurisdiction encompasses separate
tests for Article 1 jurisdiction ratione loci and personae. However, if the pre-
vious case law, "in dealing with the question whether there was jurisdiction
ratione personae,'2 0 was in fact the line of cases recognizing SAA over per-
sons, and these cases also involved extraterritorial application of the
Convention, then it is difficult to see how such a test does not also implicitly
accommodate spatial jurisdiction. 22 ' The dissent's observation remains useful
in that both concepts remain distinct components of Article 1 jurisdiction,
though its assertion that they require recourse to separate jurisdictional tests
may be mistaken. 2 2 More importantly, their interrelationship in the extraterri-
torial context has already been definitively established.22 3 It appears that the
constantly evolving jurisprudence of Article 1 seeks to establish a balance in
which the causal relationship between the state party and the affected persons
is neither too attenuated nor too proximate to justify its application beyond a
state's territory. Where this balance will ultimately lie remains a matter of
evolving doctrine.
1. Retrenchment of Extraterritorial Application
Under Drozd and Bankovi6
Article 1 nonetheless has its limits, and even in compelling cases, it is
unable to accommodate every instance of alleged human rights abuses in the
European sphere. The case of Drozd v. France, involving claimants convicted
219. Loizidou I1, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 549 (Go1ciikli, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
222. While the establishment of personal and territorial jurisdiction under Article 1 may
be coextensive when addressing a Convention claim within a state party's own territory, the
dissent's specific contention is more likely aimed at the Court's practice of merging these two
concepts in the extraterritorial context. Certainly the Cyprus v. Turkey line of cases establish-
ing Article 1 jurisdiction on the basis of SAA over persons clearly indicates that a nexus
between state conduct and individuals is not only necessary to establish state jurisdiction over
persons, but also sufficient to establish jurisdiction even over territory, including foreign terri-
tory. See sources cited supra notes 216-218.
223. Behrami v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE10 85,
69 (2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i--001-80830
("[Article 1] jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial and, while the notion of compat-
ibility ratione personae of complaints is distinct, the two concepts can be inter-dependent."
(citations omitted)).
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by a court in Andorra and serving prison sentences in France, is one such
example.224 Alleging violations of Article 6 by Spain and France and of Ar-
ticle 5 by France, the applicants' claims were nonetheless deemed
inadmissible given the sui generis status and characteristics of the Andorran
state, over which neither Spain nor France exercised exclusive jurisdiction
in any official capacity. 25 At the outset, the Court held that with regard to
the Article 6 claim, there was no jurisdiction ratione loci given that Andorra
was not "a party to the Convention in its own right," nor was it a Franco-
Spanish condominium. 2 26 As a separate matter, it examined whether France
or Spain exercised Article 1 jurisdiction over the claimants ratione personae
with regard to the Article 6 claims. It found that neither France nor Spain
exercised Article 1 jurisdiction over the proceedings in Andorran courts, and
though the judges were appointed by the Co-Princes acting jointly, they did
not act in their national capacity as French or Spanish judges and were not
"subject to supervision by the authorities of France or Spain.2 2 7 The Article
5 claims against France (alleging the absence of a legal basis in its national
laws for applicants' imprisonment) were rejected on grounds that the an-
cient tradition, whereby longer Andorran prison terms could be served in
France, constituted a sufficient legal basis for the arrangement,228 and that
the French courts exercised control by assessing Andorran trials for flagrant
error before agreeing to take prisoners on its behalf.229 Although a joint dis-
sent registered its displeasure with the situation, it ultimately conceded that
the problem lay outside the scope of the authority of the Commission and
required a political solution.
2 °
As noted at the outset of this Article, the Court's most significant
attempt to restrict Article 1 jurisdiction prior to 2011 occurred in Bankovi6,
a landmark Grand Chamber decision involving claims arising from NATO
air strikes in the former Republic of Yugoslavia,2 3 ' at that time not yet a
member of the Council of Europe.232 The Court stressed the territorial bases
of Article I jurisdiction while emphasizing that "its recognition of the
224. Drozd v. France, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 11 (1992).
225. Id. U 67-70, 77-78.
226. Id. T 89.
227. Id. T 96.
228. ld. 107, 110.
229. Id. 110.
230. See id. at 35 (Pettiti et al., JJ., dissenting). ("It seems difficult to accept that there is
a watertight partition between the entity of Andorra and the States to which the two Co-
Princes belong, when in so many respects ... those States participate in its administration. It
must thus be considered that the Co-Princes should even now use their authority and influence
in order to give effect in Andorra to the fundamental principles of the European Convention on
Human Rights....").
231. Bankovi6 v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, $ 7-11.
232. Id. T 42. ("In the present case, the Governments note that the FRY was not and is




exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is
exceptional. ' 23  The Court's approach in BankoviW can be characterized as
stressing jurisdictional links ratione loci by focusing on the predominantly
metropolitan territorial paradigm of the Convention. One commentator has
proposed that the effect of Bankovi6 was to create a presumption against
extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 1.134 By deemphasizing and even
contesting Article 1 relevance to state extraterritorial actions with very
attenuated links ratione personae, the Bankovi6 decision undoubtedly
attempted to rein in the extraterritorial jurisprudence of Article 1.
Accordingly, direct control over persons by the armed forces or other agents
of the state were conceded to qualify as recognized grounds for jurisdiction,
while air strikes producing extraterritorial harm constituted too indirect a
causal relationship between the states and the victims. 235 In effect, Bankovie
may stand for the proposition that although a state's extraterritorial act
might produce harm falling within the Convention's subject-matter scope, if
the state's personal jurisdiction is too attenuated to constitute a sufficiently
direct causal relationship between the state and the victims, Article 1
jurisdiction will be precluded,
Both the Drozd and Bankovik decisions stand out for the way in which
they treat Article 1 as comprising two distinct elements: personal scope and
territorial scope. In Drozd, the bifurcated analysis under the Article 6 claim
made this distinction explicit;236 in Bankovi6, the separate consideration of
jurisdiction over persons and places was more tacit.237 The distinction be-
tween these two different kinds of jurisdiction, and the acknowledgment of
their coexistence within Article 1, nonetheless remains an important contri-
bution to the issue. Accordingly, extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 1
may be grounded in the Convention's scope of application over places, per-
sons, or both.
By contrast, in cases involving the Convention's domestic, or territorial,
application, the double-barreled character of jurisdiction is less obvious. This
is because in domestic territorial matters, Article 1 jurisdiction is primarily de-
termined through recourse to the ratione loci element. 238 The primacy of
jurisdiction over a place is evidenced by the Convention's drafting history
233. Id. ( 59, 71.
234. O'Boyle, supra note 21, at 136.
235. Bankovi6, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. (f 71, 73.
236. Drozd v. France, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 89, 96 (1992) (finding (1) that juris-
diction ratione loci was not established since Andorra was not a party to the Convention, and
(2) that jurisdiction ratione personae was not established through the participation of France
and Spain in the Andorran court proceedings).
237. See Bankovi6, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 71, 74-82.
238. See Ilascu v. Moldova, 2004-Vl Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, 262 T 312 ("From the stand-
point of public international law, the words 'within their jurisdiction' in Article 1 of the
Convention must be understood to mean that a State's jurisdictional competence is primarily
territorial ... but also that jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the
State's territory.").
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and its emphasis on making the Convention's limited territorial application
coextensive with a party's territory and persons within it.239 Moreover, the
idea that "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is neces-
sarily exclusive and absolute" has long been an accepted international legal
principle.2" It is therefore likely that within a state party's metropolitan ter-
ritory, Article 1 jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae remain
presumptively coextensive; a separate showing of SAA over persons is not
required because it is presumed to exist. Today, Convention jurisprudence
confirms that to the extent that the relevant acts occur within a state's own
metropolitan territory, the twin Article 1 elements ratione loci and personae
are presumed satisfied.
241
It is only in the extraterritorial context that the ratione personae
component has become particularly critical to the jurisdiction analysis-
enabling recognition, for example, of the nexus between a sovereign and its
flag vessels or aircraft, diplomatic or consular personnel, or military forces
on foreign soil.242 In all such instances, what is asserted is certainly not ju-
risdiction over a place, but a fictional jurisdiction ratione personae. As the
next Section illustrates, Bankovi's attempts to isolate a consistent doctrinal
core against a rapidly evolving body of jurisprudence have proven to be of
limited influence.
D. Post-Bankovi6 Rebound in Extraterritorial Application
Despite Bankovik's attempts to limit instances of extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Convention, the ECA basis for jurisdiction continued to widen to
accommodate new instances of extraterritorial applicability. Extraterritorial
jurisdiction can now be established where a state exercises either effective
authority or a "decisive influence" over a local authority in foreign territory
by means of military, economic, financial, and political support, even where
no effective overall control of the territory can be shown.2 4 3 The Court ap-
pears even to recognize ECA without control over local authorities. 244 Since
Al-Skeini, however, the Court has conveniently consolidated many recog-
nized bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction under fewer heads.245
Another factor militating against Bankovk's retrenchment has been the
continued expansion of the SAA basis for extraterritorial application. For
example, Turkey took custody of the alleged founder and leader of the
239. See supra Part II.C.
240. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, II U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
241. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim irketi v. Ireland, 2005-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 137; Assanidze v. Georgia, 2004-H Eur. Ct. H.R. 221, it 137, 139 (2004);
lascu, 2004-Vi Eur. Ct. H.R. 312.
242. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
243. lascu, 2004-VH Eur. Ct. H.R. 9H 392-394.
244. See Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96,41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, 11 70, 74 (2004).
245. AI-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, 131-140
(characterizing the grounds for extraterritorial jurisdiction as comprising either SAA or ECA).
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Workers' Party of Kurdistan movement in Kenya with the cooperation and
assistance of Kenyan authorities. The applicant, Ocalan, raised several
claims, including one under Article 5(1) alleging that his arrest and deten-
tion by Turkish authorities was unlawful because it took place on foreign
soil and therefore could not be a legitimate exercise of Turkey's authority.246
The Court used a multipronged inquiry to decide whether an extraterritorial
arrest is lawful for purposes of Article 5(1): whether the alleged acts were
within the state's Article 1 jurisdiction, whether they were conducted in con-
formity with that state's laws, and whether they infringed on the third state's
sovereignty or international laws.247 Although the events took place well
outside the Convention's espace juridique so heavily emphasized in
Bankovi6, the Court nonetheless held that Turkey's Article 1 jurisdiction was
engaged when its agents took custody of Ocalan and arrested him in the in-
ternational zone of the Nairobi airport and that this direct physical control was
distinguishable from the factual circumstances of the air strike deemed inad-
missible under Bankovik. 248 While both pre- and post-Bankovie jurisprudence
confirms the existence of SAA over persons as a legitimate basis for establish-
ing extraterritorial jurisdiction both within and beyond European legal
space, 249 it has only been formally recognized as such since A1-Skeini.
The decision in icalan goes some way toward promoting the thesis that
extraterritorial jurisdiction can be entirely bootstrapped by jurisdiction ra-
tione personae-as demonstrated by the physical custody of Turkish agents
on a Turkish plane.25° Moreover, it demonstrates that the personal jurisdic-
tion component of Article 1 is capable of overriding even the greatest
deficiencies in jurisdiction ratione loci: absence of territorial control over a
nonstate party not only beyond the Convention's espace juridique, but also
well outside the European geographic sphere.
In the extraterritorial context, then, the jurisdiction analysis necessarily
relies on the personal component. What Ocalan demonstrates is that per-
sonal jurisdiction may have such primacy in extraterritorial circumstances
as to single-handedly establish Article 1 jurisdiction where the causal link
between the state and applicants is sufficiently direct or proximate.
The persistent emphasis on the ratione personae element in extraterrito-
rial instances of Article 1 jurisdiction is also consistent with the limited
instances in which extraterritorial jurisdiction is recognized in customary in-
ternational law. As the Court observed in Bankovi6,
246. Ocalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, 73-74.
247. Id. IT 91-99; Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 238, In 93-
103 (2003).
248. Ocalan, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 91.
249. AI-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 95, TT 86-
88 (2009); Sdnchez-Ramirez v. France, 86 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 155, 161-62
(1996).
250. Ocalan, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. T 91.
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[w]hile international law does not exclude a State's exercise of ju-
risdiction extra-territorially, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction
(including nationality, flag, diplomatic and consular relations, ef-
fect, protection, passive personality and universality) are, as a
general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights
of the other relevant States.
2 51
It is arguably precisely because each state's sovereignty is limited by the
sovereign territorial rights of others that extraterritorial jurisdiction may fa-
vor a jurisdictional nexus to persons.
If the personal jurisdiction component becomes the overriding factor in
evaluating extraterritorial jurisdiction, what role is played by the territorial
component? The relevance of jurisdiction ratione loci in the confined con-
text of extraterritoriality becomes diminished to the point of serving only as
a backup function: to establish an alternate, indirect basis through which
personal jurisdictional links can be construed or inferred, In this way, ECA
creates circumstances in which SAA over persons can be presumptively es-
tablished.2 52 Stated differently, in the extraterritorial context, it is the state's
nexus to persons that becomes the pivotal element of Article 1 jurisdiction,
whether established directly through some form of SAA over persons, or
indirectly through attenuated links to foreign territory. Ultimately, jurisdic-
tional connections ratione personae have become the necessary and
sufficient means for establishing Article 1 jurisdiction. This outcome is
arguably confirmed by the Court's decision in Al-Skeini, recognizing the
victims' deaths as collectively resulting from the United Kingdom's exercise
of jurisdiction over persons rather than territory-a surprising determination
given not only the lack of physical custody of some of the victims, but the
formal acknowledgment of the United Kingdom's presence in Iraq as one of
formal military occupation potentially able to facilitate establishment of a
territorial (ECA) basis for jurisdiction." 3
This Section sought to emphasize the rapid and ad hoc development of
Article 1 jurisprudence and the difficulty with which it can be confined to
the articulation of clear principles. The next Section examines ECHR juris-
251. Bankovi6 v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 59 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
252. See Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, [74 (2004)
(concluding that Article 1 jurisdiction was not established where there was insufficient evi-
dence to link the presence of Turkish troops in Iraq to the applicants' deaths).
253. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, T 149
(2011) (finding that "the United Kingdom... assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of the pub-
lic powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government," including "authority and
responsibility for the maintenance of security in South East Iraq," and accordingly determin-
ing that "[i]n these exceptional circumstances... the United Kingdom ... exercised authority
and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish
a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article
1 of the Convention").
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prudence pertaining to the dual application of Articles 1 and 56 in order to
better understand the interrelationship between these two provisions.
E. Case Law Governing the Interaction Between Articles I and 56
1. Article 56 Attempts to Limit Article 1
We have observed above that Turkey first raised the argument that Arti-
cle 56 could be read so as to restrictively interpret Article 1 jurisdiction as
applying to metropolitan territory only.254 According to this argument, since
Article 56 governs the dependent territories, then Article 1 jurisdiction must
accordingly be limited to the metropolitan territories. Although the Com-
mission first rejected this argument in 1975,255 attempts to rely on Article 56
as a means of confirming the scope of Article 1 jurisdiction have persistently
been raised by state parties.211
Subsequent to the Commission's rejection of this argument in 1975,
Turkey argued that the territorial restrictions provided for under former Arti-
cle 63 could be read to permit similar territorial restrictions of former
Article 25, thus legitimizing declarations of restriction pertaining thereto.
257
In this way, Turkey could legitimately limit the Commission's competence
to matters concerning the metropolitan territory only, preventing it from ex-
amining claims brought by Cyprus. Predictably, this argument was rejected
by both the Commission2158 and the Court.
25 9
The basic idea that Article 56 may have bearing on the meaning and in-
terpretation of Article 1 jurisdiction is a theoretically sound one. Moreover,
the idea that former Article 63 could legitimize territorial limitations under
former Article 25 (and consequently limit Article 1 jurisdiction in the pro-
cess) garnered support from dissenting judges in both the Commission
260
and the Court.261 In a separate dissenting opinion in Loizidou v. Turkey, Mr.
Golciikli observed:
"If a State may exclude the application of Article 25 to a territory
referred to in Article 63, there would seem to be no specific reason
254. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
125 (1975).
255. Id. at 136-37.
256. Loizidou II, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, [56 (1996); Loizidou I,
App. No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 135 80, 136 86 (1995); Chrysostomos v. Turkey,
App. Nos. 15299/89, 15300/89, 15318/89, 68 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 216 (1991).
257. See Chrysostomos, 68 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 238, 3, 248 40-42;
Loizidou 1, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 135 80, 136 86 (1995).
258. Chrysostomos, 68 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 248 91 40-42.
259. Loizidou 1, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 135 % 80, 136 186.
260. Id. at 121 (Norgaard et al., JJ., partly concurring, partly dissenting) (Comnuission
decision reprinted in full within Court's judgment).
261. See id. at 141, 142 (Golcuikli & Pettiti, JJ., dissenting); id. at 147 (GolcUklu, J., dis-
senting).
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why it should not be allowed to exclude the application of the right
of individual petition to a territory having even looser constitutional
ties with the State's main territory."
262
Mr. Gt6lctiklil further observed that:
"It might be argued, therefore, that Article 63(4) has evolved into a
clause conferring unfettered discretion on States concerning the ter-
ritorial scope of their declarations under Article 25, whenever
territories beyond the national boundaries are concerned.
2 63
This position has remained a minority view on the Court, yet it makes a
compelling point that if territorial restrictions are permitted under former
Article 63 with regard to dependencies, there is little sense, from a policy
standpoint, in not allowing the same for territories "having even looser con-
stitutional ties" with the state's metropolitan territory. 264 These comments
neatly encapsulate the paradoxical interplay between Articles 1 and 56.
In Ilascu v. Moldova, the Court held that Article 56 cannot be construed
as permitting a declaration restricting the Convention to only part of its met-
ropolitan territory, whether as a negative declaration under former Article 25
or on its own. 265 Fifteen years after Turkey first attempted to rely on former
Article 63 to restrict the meaning of Article 1 jurisdiction, a Grand Chamber
of the Court finally articulated a broad rejection of the argument that is like-
ly to settle the matter once and for all, stating that
neither the spirit nor the terms of Article 56, which provides for ex-
tending the Convention's application to territories other than the
metropolitan territories of the High Contracting Parties, could per-
mit of a negative interpretation in the sense of restricting the scope
of the term "jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 1 to only
part of the territory.
266
The Court in Ilascu left no doubt that Article 56 cannot be used to inter-
pret Article 1 in a territorially restrictive manner. Naturally, given the
functional relationship between Articles 1 and 56 regarding the extraterrito-
rial scope of the Convention, interpretive attempts relying on the interplay
of the two provisions could not be expected to be exclusively one-sided.
262. Id. at 146 (GlcildO, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 121-22 (Norgaard et al., JJ.,
partly concurring, partly dissenting) (Commission decision)).
263. Id. at 147 (quoting Christian Tomuschat, Turkey's Declaration Under Article 25 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, in FORTSCHRITT IM BEWUSSTEIN DER GRUND-
UND MENSCHENRECHTE: FESTSCHRIFTr FOR FELIX ERMACORA [PROGRESS IN THE SPIRIT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS] 128-29 (Nowak et al. eds., 1988)).
264. Id. at 146 (quoting id. at 121-22 (Norgaard et al., 3J., partly concurring, partly dis-
senting) (Commission decision)).





What follows is an examination of the converse: attempts to rely on Article
1 jurisdiction as a means of broadening the interpretation of Article 56.
2. Article 1 Attempts to Broaden Article 56:
The Extraterritorial Absurdity Revealed
It is only with the benefit of hindsight that one can appreciate how the
jurisprudential developments under Article 1 have come to influence the
tactical approaches subsequently taken in parties' Article 56 claims. As ob-
served above, Article 56 territories have been defined mostly by reliance
upon or deference to state-party designations for European territories267 and
by unilateral declarations for traditionally colonial, non-European territo-
ries. In this way, once a dependency is identified as an Article 56 territory,
the Court tends to require strict compliance with declaration requirements.
This strict reliance on Articles 56(1) and 56(4) declaration requirements has
been a consistent feature of Article 56 jurisprudence. 26 However, the dyna-
mism of Article 1 case law, beginning with the Cyprus v. Turkey line of
cases,2 69 has provided applicants with new strategic approaches with regard
to the unyielding requirements of Article 56.
The first instance in which an applicant sought to sidestep Article 56 de-
ficiencies with Article 1 arguments can be found in Bui Van Thanh v. United
Kingdom, a 1990 Commission decision.270 Claimants were Vietnamese boat
people in British-controlled Hong Kong, where they were denied refugee
status and detained pending deportation to Vietnam, which they alleged
would result in an Article 3 violation.2 71 Prior to 1988, Hong Kong automat-
ically accorded refugee status to such persons, but a change in Hong Kong
policy gave rise to the claim.272 At the time, Hong Kong was under British
control, but the United Kingdom had never made a declaration of extension
under former Article 63.273 Claimants argued that the absence of such a dec-
laration was irrelevant.274 Instead, citing both Hess and Cyprus v. Turkey,
they argued that Britain's de facto control of Hong Kong's deportation poli-
cy operated to bring the territory under Article 1 jurisdiction.27 Unable to
construe its way out of the strictures of former Article 63, the Commission
came to the uncomfortable conclusion that although Article 1 may in certain
circumstances extend outside a state party's territory,
2 76
267. See supra notes 170-179 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Part II.A.2.
269. See sources cited supra notes 216-218.
270. Bui Van Thanh v. United Kingdom, App. No. 16137/90, 65 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 330 (1990).




275. Id. at 331-32.
276. Id. at 332.
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the Convention system also provides the State with the option of
extending the Convention to territories for whose international rela-
tions it is responsible by lodging a declaration under Article 63
para. 1 of the Convention, with the result that matters relating to
such territories fall within the jurisdiction of the High Contracting
Party within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. It is an es-
sential part of the scheme of Article 63 that a declaration extending
the Convention to such a territory be made before the Convention
applies either to acts of the dependent Government or to policies
formulated by the Government of a Contracting Party in the exer-
cise of its responsibilities in relation to such territory. Accordingly,
in the present case, even if the Commission were to accept that the
acts of the Hong Kong authorities were based on United Kingdom
policy, it must find that it has no competence to examine the appli-
cation since no declaration under Article 63 para. 1 has been made
in respect of Hong Kong.277
In this statement, the Commission appears to confirm the relationship of
Article 1 to former Article 63 proposed here, whereby a declaration of ex-
tension under the latter brings a territory within the purview of the former.
This comment refines the outright rejection made by the Commission in
1975 in Cyprus v. Turkey of the argument that if Article 63 governed de-
pendent territories, then Article 1 must consequently be limited to a state's
metropolitan territory.78 Instead, Bui Van Thanh confirms the highly interac-
tive nature of the two provisions: an Article 63 declaration brings a
dependent territory from altogether outside the scope of the Convention to
within Article 1 jurisdiction.2 79 Seen in this way, Article 63 presumptively
excludes such territories until they are explicitly included, at which time
they fall under Article 1 jurisdiction.
This rule creates a paradoxical outcome whereby Article 1 jurisdiction
is bifurcated, requiring one set of elements for dependent territories and an-
other set of elements for all others. Accordingly, an explicit voluntary
declaration remains necessary in order to establish Article 1 jurisdiction for
a party's dependent territories, but judicially established extraterritorial ba-
ses remain sufficient to establish it for any other territory. The effective
result is one that allows states with dependent territories to voluntarily limit
their Convention responsibility despite extensive constitutional ties and last-
ing control and influence in such territories but not in regard to any other
territories. As a result, Article 1 jurisdiction can be established involuntarily,
by means of an objective test when the territory is not a formal dependency,
277. Id. at 333.
278. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
125, In 7-10 (1975).
279. See Bui Van Thanh, 65 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 333.
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but can be shirked at will when a historical relationship and constitutional
ties between the territory and the state party are present.
20
In Yonghong v. Portugal, a similar situation arose in which a Taiwanese
man arrested in formerly Portuguese-controlled Macau sought to challenge
China's extradition request on grounds that it would result in violations of
Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention.28 ' At the time that the Chinese govern-
ment sought the applicant's extradition from Portugal, the territory of Macau
was a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration pending transfer of
sovereignty back to China on December 20, 1999.282 The applicant argued
that Portugal's failure to make an Article 56 declaration extending the Con-
vention to Macau was not fatal to his claim since Portugal exercised its
Article 1 jurisdiction in Macau and the governor of Macau, the Portuguese
government's main representative there, had granted the Macanese courts
leave to begin extradition hearings on the matter.283 As with the preceding
case, the argument that Article 1 grounds for extraterritorial jurisdiction
could supplant Article 56 requirements was rejected. 284 The Court confirmed
the independent and inflexible operation of Article 56:
An essential feature of the system established by Article 56 is that
the Convention cannot apply to acts of the authorities of such terri-
tories, nor to the policies implemented by the government of the
Contracting Party concerned in the exercise of their responsibilities
for those territories, unless a declaration extending the ambit of the
Convention has been made. 85
This position has been reaffirmed as recently as 2006 in the context of
an analogous "colonial clause" provision in the First Protocol. 286 Quark
Fishing Ltd. v. United Kingdom involved a First Protocol claim brought by
the owner of a fishing vessel under a Falklands flag whose fishing license
was arbitrarily rejected in U.K. courts.287 Although the United Kingdom had
made a declaration of extension under Article 56, it had not done so with
280. See id. at 332-33.
281. Yonghong v. Portugal, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 385, 389-90.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 391.
284. Id. at 392; Bui Van Thanh, 65 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 333.
285. Yonghong, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 392.
286. ECHR Protocol, supra note 54, art. 4. This Protocol stipulated in part:
Any High Contracting Party may at the time of signature or ratification or at any
time thereafter communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a
declaration stating the extent to which it undertakes that the provisions of the pre-
sent Protocol shall apply to such of the territories for the international relations of
which it is responsible as are named therein.
Id.
287. Quark Fishing Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 15305/06, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE4
70,70-71 (2006).
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regard to the First Protocol.288 The claimant argued that the Article 56 defect
was not fatal, since the relevant officials "were either directly controlled or
could be overruled by the Contracting State, and persons within a territory
can rely on the full range of Convention rights if a Contracting State exer-
cised effective overall control over that territory."289 Unsurprisingly, the
Court rejected this argument in line with its established precedent on the
matter.290 The claimant, however, raised a second and more novel claim:
even without the declaration extending the First Protocol to the Falklands,
Article 56 was outdated-the Convention rights had already been extended
to the territory under that provision, and the Court should construe the exist-
ence of the Protocol's extension to the territory in order to avoid any gaps in
coverage. 29' In response, the Court offered a surprisingly sympathetic reply
in which it conceded the antiquated nature of the provision but observed its
duty to enforce it nonetheless:
The Court can only agree that the situation has changed considera-
bly since the time that the contracting parties drafted the
Convention, including former Art. 63. Interpretation, albeit a neces-
sary tool to render the protection of Convention rights practical and
effective, can only go so far. It cannot unwrite provisions contained
in the Convention. If the contracting states wish to bring the decla-
rations system to an end, this can only be possible through an
amendment to the Convention to which those states agree and give
evidence of their agreement through signature and ratification.
Since there is no dispute as to the status of the SGSSI as a territory
for whose international relations the United Kingdom is responsible
within the meaning of Art. 56, the Court finds that the Convention
and Protocols cannot apply unless expressly extended by declara-
tion. The fact that the United Kingdom has extended the
Convention itself to the territory gives no ground for finding that
Protocol No. 1 must also apply or for the Court to require the Unit-
ed Kingdom somehow to justify its failure to extend that Protocol.
There is no obligation under the Convention for any contracting
state to ratify any particular Protocol or to give reasons for its deci-
sions in that regard concerning its national jurisdictions. Still less
can there be any such obligation as regards the territories falling
under the scope of Art. 56 of the Convention.
292
288. Id. at 72.
289. Id. at 71-72.
290. For findings that Articles 56 and 1 constitute separate and distinct grounds for es-
tablishing Convention jurisdiction, see, for example, Yonghong, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 385;
Bui Van Thanh v. United Kingdom, App. No. 16137/90, 64 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
330, 330 (1990); Gillow v. United Kingdom, 109 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 162 (1986).
291. Quark Fishing Ltd., 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 72.
292. Id. at 72-73.
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The Article 56 cases examined here evince multiple attempts to sidestep
formal compliance with that provision's declaration requirements. In every
instance, such arguments rely upon the expansive bases for the Convention's
extraterritorial application under Article 1. This trend demonstrates not only
an implicit recognition of the intransigence of Article 56 jurisprudence, but
also an attempt to harness the greater flexibility found in Article 1 case law.
While judicial responses have been exceptionally uniform in their rejection
of these arguments, they nonetheless have produced a problematic incon-
sistency in the extraterritorial application of the Convention whereby Article
1 jurisdiction can be forcibly imposed on a state party with regard to all ter-
ritories except dependencies, where jurisdiction remains expressly
voluntary.
CONCLUSION
This Article opened with Al-Skeini in order to illustrate the dilemmas of
extraterritorial treaty application. When should a state's treaty obligations
apply to its foreign conduct? How should such extraterritorial obligations be
determined? And most importantly, can they be distilled into a coherent set
of principles? The Court's response to this issue clearly remains under de-
velopment.
As long-awaited clarifications on the Convention's extraterritoriality,
Al-Skeini and its paired decision in Al-Jedda have produced disappointing
results. Though they will surely be heralded for disowning certain Bankovi6
features-such as the implied regional restriction on Convention application
or the nondivisibility of Convention rights-the lasting impression remains
one of continued confusion.2 93 In the end, these judgments perpetuate the
sense that Convention jurisprudence on extraterritoriality remains "bedev-
iled by an inability or an unwillingness to establish a coherent and axiomatic
regime, grounded in essential basics and even-handedly applicable across
the widest spectrum of jurisdictional controversies.
'294
Article 1 jurisdiction reveals itself to be highly complex, operating dif-
ferently in territorial contexts than it does extraterritorially. This Article
proposes that jurisdiction ratione personae constitutes the pivotal compo-
nent and the most compelling element in determining Article 1 jurisdiction
extraterritorially. In contrast, the significance of a state's nexus to territory
becomes a secondary consideration at best. Moreover, the coherence of to-
day's Article 1 jurisprudence, in which Convention rights can be "divided
and tailored" under certain jurisdictional circumstances (SAA over per-
sons) 295 but not others (ECA)296 remains questionable. Finally, the tenuous
293. Bankovid v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 80-81.
294. A1-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, 78 (2011)
(Bonello, J., concurring).
295. Id. 137 (majority opinion).
296. See Bankovi, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 70, 75.
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interaction between Article 1 and Article 56 has produced paradoxical re-
suits whereby extraterritorial jurisdiction may be forcibly judicially
recognized in ad hoc situations, yet is subject to a state's discretionary ex-
tension in its own dependencies where the jurisdictional relationship is most
highly developed.
Amid these myriad complexities, one aspect of Convention jurispru-
dence on extraterritorial application is clear: it is highly contextualized,
bound up not only in the drafting history of its respective provisions, but al-
so in the complex interplay between Articles 1 and 56. Compounding these
complexities is the contrasting case law of both provisions, whereby one
remains rigidly static while the other continues to develop unfettered by the
constraints of doctrinal coherence.
These observations have significant implications for international courts
and scholars. Most importantly, they undermine the feasibility of sweeping
"convergence theory" approaches that examine the extraterritorial scope of
treaties on the basis of common threads such as a shared human rights con-
text, common treaty obligations at issue, or even similarly framed
"jurisdiction" clauses across such instruments.2 97 Such approaches fail to
accommodate the highly particularized nature of specific treaty provisions at
issue, their textual and operational interplay, and the shifting, dynamic, and
oftentimes paradoxical jurisprudential developments that shape them. If the
297. Cerone has observed that "cross fertilization is a common phenomenon among re-
gional [human rights] institutions." John Cerone, The Application of Regional Human Rights
Law Beyond Regional Frontiers: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and U.S.
Activities in Iraq, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Oct. 25, 2005), http://www.asil.org/
insights051025.cfm. Similarly, Coomans and Kamminga assert that, as between the U.N.
Covenants and the American and European human rights instruments, there exists "general
agreement between supervisory bodies" as to the general framework for determining their ex-
traterritorial application for states exercising effective control over a territory or over persons.
Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga, Comparative Introductory Comments on the Extra-
territorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 21, at 1, 3-4. A more implicit approach to cross-
fertilization in the context of the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties first
emerged among commentators. Theodor Meron, Agora: The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti, Extra-
territoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 58, 80-81 (1995); Kelvin
Widdows, Shorter Article, The Application of Treaties to Nationals of a Party Outside Its Ter-
ritory, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 724, 728 (1986). Today the convergence approach is
particularly on display in the refugee law context, by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu-
gees and among commentators. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on
the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, 42 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45f17ala4.html ("In [the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugee]'s view, the reasoning adopted by courts and human rights treaty bodies in their au-
thoritative interpretation of the relevant human rights provisions is relevant also to the
prohibition of refoulement under international refugee law, given the similar nature of the ob-
ligations and the object and purpose of the treaties which form their legal basis."); JAMES
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 159-71 (2005); Elihu
Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 110-14 (Erika Feller et
al. eds., 2003).
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European Convention indeed offers a representative example of the factors
that shape a treaty's extraterritorial application, its lesson must surely be that
it cannot be distilled into a sweeping general principle but must instead be
determined on a highly contextualized, case-by-case basis.

